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THE COITTROL OF BUSINESS IN A FASCIST STATE
The world of 1939 presents a far different picture
fron: that which most people twenty years ago thought it
would be. The World War had left behind it huge pro-
blems of political and economic adjustments. In the
industrial fields tnere existed problenis of great m.ag-
nitude brought about by such factors as the curtail-
ment of foreign trade, the arm.am.ent programs of the
warring nations and the huge public debts incurred to
"m.ake the world safe for demiocracy.” Significantly
enough, at least three of the major countries of the
world--Russia
,
Italy, and Germany--have rejected this
gift of democracy and in its place have sought to
find a national prosperity with all its attendant
benefits under a dictatorship.
The post-war period in Italy and Germany found
both nations--one
,
a victor; the other, the vanquished--
very bitter concerning the errors of Versailles at the
close of the war. In Italy a fortuitous combination
of circum.stance s : a very weak form of parliamentary
government, the agitation of the Commiunistic forces and
the opposition of the Socialists, the opportune appear-
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ance of a strong man like Mussolini, all conspired to
overturn the existing regime and introduce a new poli-
tical economy--Fascism.. In Germany Adolf Hitler,
aided in many ways by Identical circumstances, was
striiggling to power. The Weim*ar Constitution, which
has been called the most democratic organ of its kind
in the world, was supported by an administration that
was far too weak to cope with the enormous problems
of its tlm.e. The Marxist com.munism. which had triumphed
in Russia was fighting to become established here
also. In the m.idst of the uncertainty and clash of
opposing political opinion Hitler was gradually
increasing his power, rising to the Chancellorship in
1933, and bringing to Germ^any under the banner of the
National Socialist Germian Workers Party (National-
sozlalistische Deutsche Arbei terpartei ) its present
Fascist state.
At this point it might be well to look briefly
at this new philosophy which can in no way become
aligned with the
"democratic principles and concepts as
exemplified by the United States. Its
proponents frankly adm.lt as much. They
say that our kind of democracy has been
outmoded by modem industry, m^ass pro-
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duction and mechanized life; that it
cannot withstand the impact of such
gigantic enterprises as have developed
through the liberties it tolerated;
that attem^pts at regulation have
failed and will continue to fail and
that there is no choice but to m.ake
the state suprem.e."!
Its proponents further call attention to the in-
creasing extent of government intervention in the
United States and the other leading democracies of
the world. But they have not stopped at pointing
out to us the attributed progress of the democratic
strongholds toward their new religion. The have
actively campaigned to bring it to us. That they
have made somie mieasure of progress no one will
deny . And
” Germany and Italy have shown that
a real trend of popular mentality
toward collectivism will wipe
demiOcracy cut--and, moreover,
should wipe it out according to
its own principle s . ”2
It is patent, then, that Fasclsmc may no longer
be identified only with one or two nations of the
world. "It represents a new world psychology, as
^Tracy, M. E., Our Country, Our People, and
Theirs
,
1938, p. 1.
^Ashton, E. 3., The Fascist; His State and His
Mind
.
1937, p. 244.
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profound, complete, and comprehensive as our own ide
ology of Democracy.'*^ As such. It is diametrically
opposed to our capitalistic structure. It is the
purpose of this discussion to examine this new philo
sophy: not primarily as pertains to a study of its
concepts and principles, but in its actual workings.
It is proposed to investigate business under its
rule, to detenrine how the economic structure is
transformed in a Fascist state, and to examine the
present m;easures of control which allow business to
function as it now exists in this totalitarian
regime
.
To understand what the Fascists are attemipting
in their econom.ic reconstruction it is also neces-
sary to understand just what this new philosophy
teaches. The layman in this country has been wat-
ching the turn of events in Italv and Germianv with
considerable interest, but with his knowledge
gathered from, the well-seasoned sources of the
newspapers. And most of this has naturally
affected the parade of inter-national happenings
^Gracchus, G. S., The Renaissance of Dem.ocracy,
1957, p. 1.
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and complications. Els attention has been absorbed in
what has taken place, and he has devoted little or no
time to an understanding of the Fascist doctrines.
Certain of these are inextricably bound up with the
Fascist economic program. Before we attem.pt an exami-
nation of the actual m.easures of control now being
employed, it v/ill be to our advantage to study these
fundam.ental and pertinent tenets.
^Nhlle there are several countries of the world
which are under the influence of this new political and
economic totalitarian dogm.a, and, indeed, whose poli-
tical administrations are partially or totally aligned
with Fascism., there will be no argumient that Italy and
Germany are its chief supporters. They are now the
only nations of m.ajor classification that have adopted
it. They v/ere its originators, and it has been from
these two states that the new political econom.y has
gone out. For the control of business in a Fascist
state we will therefore limiit any exam.lnaticn to the
situations as they exist in these tv/o nations.
For an understanding of these econom.ic mechanisms
in their present form a brief initial consideration of
the history of these states has seemed desirable. The
ascendency of the Fascist Parties to a position of
power in their respective nations was not an overnight
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transition. They developed slowly, and during their
development many of the principles which they were sub-
sequently to employ were evolved. For this reason it
is also desirable to trace in some detail the history
of the rise of the Fascist Party in Italy and of the
National Socialist Germian Workers’ Party in Germany,
and to look at the m.easures which they employed to
establish their respective regimiCs. From there we
will proceed to an actual examiination of the economic
structure. Many of the features of our own system, of
capitalism, have been retained, but in m.any other
aspects salient characteristics have been rejected.
In miany instances full governm.ent subsidization and
nationalization has taken place. There is no form of
business that has entirely escaped the control of the
totalitarian forces in power. These m.easures end
regulations will be considered thoroughly.
It is inescapable that som.e conclusions as to the
success or failure of Fascist econom.y will be drawn.
However, it is neither our prerogative nor our purpose
to attemipt to forecast the eventual outcome of this
struggle between the forces of Capitalism under Demo-
cracv and the forces of Collectivism under Fascism;.
In fairness to the latter it is far too early to attempt
such a diagnosis. Italy, the first of the nations to
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attempt to organize itself on a corporate footing, is
now only in its sixteenth year under Mussolini. 1934
saw the Institution of a radically new corporate set-
up in his country. He, himself, recognizes that it has
been impossible within this short time to become fully
organized in the most desirable manner. He admits that
they are blazing a trail by the method of trial and
error. Germ.any has had less time to organize than has
Italy, being ten years in point of tim.e behind its sis-
ter Fascist state. Despite a program which has been
more vigorous, and in som.e ways m.ore effective than
that of Italy, Hitler has constructed thus far only a
framework for the finished product. Nevertheless, at
this early date som.e conclusions are becom.ing evident.
Som:e situations and conditions in the business and
industrial fields are admittedly conceded to be the
result of the Dictators’ programis and of their measures
of control over the economiic structure of the countries.
It will be the purpose of this discussion to set these
results down, contrasting them, wherever it is feasible
within the bounds of scientific accuracy with the prin-
ciples of Capitalism, and Liberalism*.
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GEJIERAI PERTINENT TENETS AND PEILOSOPKY OF FASCISM
There have been a number of descriptive terms
applied to the Fascist State. We m.ay constantly hear
Italy or Germany referred to as a Totalitarian State
or a Corporate State, or find a reference in discus-
sions to their collectivism, sydicalism or nationalism.
All of the political and econom.ic doctrines which these
expressions em^body may be set forth, for the purposes
of this discussion, in a few fundamental tenets. It is
these dogmas which have remade these two great nations;
which under the strong hand of an inflexible dictator
have revolutionized the philosophy and thinking of
great m.asses of people within these states, and thus
enabled each country to rem.odel its entire system, of
business and industry.
Nationalism.
.
The first and most dominant characteristic of
this new religion is its intense and aggressive nation-
alism. "All other Fascist doctrines have sprung from
a creed of fervid, passionate nationalism. Though
Fascism, m.akes no extraordinary dem.ands upon the average
Italian, the intense nationalism of the m.ovement stirs
him and m.akes him feel, as no other m;Ovem.ent has done
in the past, that he is a living part of the national
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coramunlty . The importance of the state Is stressed
at all times. Each member of the community is con-
stantly impressed with the doctrine that the state is
all important. Nothing matters but the state. He is
taught that it accepts the individual only when its
interests coincide v/ith his. "The State is all embra-
cing--beyond it no human or spiritual concepts can
exist. . . . The totalitarian state should be the
vehicle through which the higher concept of the nation
finds external manifestation."^ If there is any con-
flict of interests it is the individual who must
always be subordinated to the welfare of the greater
number
.
"The state being all dom.inant, it fol-
lows directly that it m.ust seek a form of
national organization which shall hold the
people together, both economically and poli-
tically, enable the nation to focus its
national aspirations, and above all, furnish
a means whereby the functioning of the
various parts of the state can be coordi-
nated and regulated as a unit."^
National unity is thus a com.ponent part of this dogm.a
of fiery nationalism. To this end Fascism, addresses
itself to the masses. It has tried to free the state
^Welk, W. G., Fascist Economic Policy
,
1938,
p. 243.
^Florinsky, M. T., Fascism and National Socialism
,
1936
,
p . 59
.
^Hullinger, E. W.
,
The New Fascist State, 1928,
p. 71.
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from sectionalism and class strife. In the industrial
field this is especially evident in its interdiction of
strikes and lockouts, aimed at the achievem.ent of indus-
trial peace through arbitration and other means. The
purposes and aims of the worker and of the emiployer are
the same, the one is a follower and the other m.erely a
leader. All are working for the state. Therefore they
should be unified in purpose and any class differences
are actually non-existent.
This Fascist doctrine of nationalism is the well-
spring of the entire philosophy. E. 3. Ashton in his
book The Fascist : His State and His Mind
,
summ.arizes
very well this all-important tenet, quoting directly
from Benito Mussolini:
"To Fascism the world is not this
material world, as it appears on the sur-
face, where Man is an individual separa-
ted from* all others and left to himself,
ruled by a law of nature causing him
through his instincts to lead an egotis-
tic and mom^entary life of pleasure. Man
in Fascism is individual, nation, and
country all at once, and is thereby a
party to the moral lav/ which binds indi-
viduals and generations together into a
tradition and a m.lssion, and which, in
supressing the instinct of a life,
enclosed in a short cycle of pleasure,
bases a higher life. ... on duty. . . .
"According to its anti-indlvidu-
allstic attitude the idea of Fascism is
for the state, and for the individual in
so far as he coincides with the state. . .
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lt is against the classical Liberalism
which had its origin in the force of
reaction against Absolutism, and which
has reached the end of its historical
function, since the state has changed
in the consciousness and will of the
people. Liberalism, negates the state
in the interest of the single indi-
vidual. It is for the only freedom
which can seriously be considered--the
freedom of the state, and of the indi-
vidual within the state , --because for
the Fascist, everything is in the state,
and outside of the state nothing legal
or spiritual can exist, or still less be
of value. In this sense Fascism is
totalitarian, and the Fascist state is
unity and synthesis of all values and
gives to the whole life of the people
its mieaning, developm.ent
,
and forceful-
ness ‘t»l
Hierarchy- -Authority
Having proclaimed the supremacy of the nation
and the state, the Fascist nations found themselves
confronted with the problem, of a form' of governiT!ent
.
Actually there was no problem., for they had no choice.
A nation in which the state is supremie m.ust reject
democracy and a democratic form' of governm.ent . This
in turn forestalls any possibility of a parliamentary
body. On the other hand, if there is to be national
unity and the state is to be suprem.e
,
there m.ust exist
at the top som.e voice of authority. Fascism thus leads
its proponents directly to a hierarchical form, of gov-
^Ashton, E. B., The Fascist: His State and His
Kind
,
1937, p. 34
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0rnment--a state founded on the principle of authority.
There must be absolute authority of the le aders over
those below, and absolute responsibility of subordi-
nates to those above. Thus it was that Mussolini and
Hitler had to assume complete power.
"Instead of (to take an extreme example
of a democratic structure) having the
people elect m.any little representatives
who elect and control the top fellows
who run the country, and of making every
representative responsible to the men
who elected him, the Fascists simply
reversed the process. They put up a
single suprem.e head of the state; he
appoints a few big officials, each of
whom, appoints a great m:any smaller ones,
and so down. .
., and every official is
responsible not to the people whose
affairs he administers but to the official ’
who appointed him."^
Thus a superior official has tantamount to supremie
authority over all those beneath him.. No alignment or
agreem.ent of subordinates m.ay hold out against the deci-
sion of their imc^ediate superiors. The Dictators natu-
rally have their advisory councils, Italy its Fascist
Grand Council and Gernany its Cabinet which exercises
the powers of the former Reichstag, but it is still a
fact that these are advisory and have no official word
or power. By this new form, of governmental organiza-
tion we find that the privilege of the vote is a saga
^Ashton, E. B., The Fascist: His State and His
Mind, 1957, p. 36.
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of the past regime. In its place is substituted the
use of authority. Governmental decision is changed to
command--the word of the higher authority is now an
order from which there is no appeal. The power of the
leader is now as strong as that of the most absolute
monarch of other days.
But to institute a hierarchy of this sort is to
presume that the great masses of people which consti-
tute the nation will accept it and follow its bidding
implicitly. This brings up the problem of discipline.
Under Fascism, it is now taken m.uch as a matter of
course
,
"Control of positions by appointment and deci-
sion of questions by command should alone suf-
fice to insure ready obedience. The Fascist
idea of discipline, however, is m>uch m.ore com-
prehensive than that to which we are accus-
tomed. It involves an unswerving purpose of
mental coordination, of surrender of indivi-
dual consciousness, and of devotion, without
reserve, of every activity of body and mind to
the collective will. Fascist discipline m.eans
the complete voluntary adjustm.ent of an indi-
vidual to a group, the change from an indepen-
dent human mind to an intellect capable of
working in a group and through a group, and
toward a goal not chosen indlviduallv but
always comn’.on to the whole community ....
The coordination is really not only natural,
but voluntary; .... For the Fascist the
function of m.aking up his mind has simply
been removed from his brain. He has to wait
until he gets his mind made up from, above, and
then he keeps right on going and concentrates
all his energy and Intelligence on carrying
out this will- -his will."l
^Ashton, G. 3., The Fascist ; Eis State and His
Mind
,
1937, p. 37.
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Of course this submission by the masses to the will of
the state was not without opposition, especially during
the first few weeks and months of the new regime. It
required then (and still requires) constant measures of
propaganda, supervision, and correction. Some of the
more recalcitrant who refuse to submit were eliminated
in the purges; others found that they were taught in
German concentration camps or Italian colonies. The
majority of the educational program has been concerned
with the youth of the two states, and here, after years
of infusion with Fascist doctrine the best results have
been obtained.
The application of this doctrine of hierarchy,
authority and discipline to the problem, of this study--
the control of business--ls self-evident. For the pro-
per coordination of the tenets of nationalism, with its
thesis of ’’through the common good to Individual inter-
est” and hierarchy with its attendant theses of autho-
rity and discipline, the only sort of economic system
which could be evolved is a totalitarian one in which
every activity of business may be supervised and
rigidly controlled if the need arises. Thus economic
activities must be guided by social organs which repre-
sent the Interests of the community and are themselves
directed by a leader who if necessary will use force.
(1
I
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The development of this postulate is fulfilled in the
evolution of the Corporate or Syndical Fascist State:
"The Corporate State itself is to be built
up on the basis of harmony of economic rela-
tions within capitalism. . . Two main
changes are necessary: firstly, to break
down anti-state political organizations and
feelings; secondly, to build up in each man
the feeling of responsibility for his job.”^
It means, in essence, a state-controlled and state-
subservient econom.y, in which employers and em-ployees
are to "collaborate with equal rights in the interest
of production--but recognizing the existence of a con-
trast between their miaterial interest." Ashton claims
that there is at this point a departure by National
Socialism from, the idea of the Corporate State as it is
declared by Italian Fascism, in that the Germans deny
any Inherent capital-labor conflict, while the Italians
adm.it it but attempt to overcome it. To quote:
"The alms of either structure are identical;
the Corporate State, too, has the principal
objective of eliminating, in the interests
of national solidarity, the class division
which capitalism is apt to bring about. The
entire difference is one of technique. The
Italians--though they deplore the contrast
between m.aterial interests of employers and
employees and seek to avert its natural con-
seauences--utill ze it as a means of economic
organization. The Germans, on the other
1
Pascal
,
Roy, The Nazi Dictatorship
, 1954
,
p. 116.
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hand, organize economic production hier-
archically and authoritatively like any
other national intere3t--and consider
capital-labor conflicts as irregulari-
ties in fact, which must be ironed out
in practice but have no claim to dogma-
tic recognition. Each system seeks to
overcome the normal capitalist trend
toward class struggle; the first attemp-
ting to straighten it out after first
using it as a structural implem*ent--the
other preferring to remove it right at
the source,"!
Capi tall sm.
It is evident from, the foregoing quotation that
Fascism retains some of the characteristics of a capi-
talist economy. In truth, the Fascist states are an
evolution of capitalism, since all of them started out
with such an economic structure. The basic principle
of Capitalism which the totalitarian powers claim to
have retained in their economic system is the preser-
vation of private property, private ownership, and
operation of the means of production, and the right of
private initiative. The Fascists go a step further,
however, and assert that such prerogatives are also a
public duty.
"Fascism* recognizes the fundam*ental func-
tion of private property, no longer in
the liberal sense of the right to enjoy
and dispose of wealth in the most absolute
manner, but understood as a social duty."^
^Ashton, E. B,
,
Kind
,
1937, p. 94.
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The Fascist : His State and His
Fascist Economy
,
1938, p. 22.
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"Corporate economy respects the principle
of private property. Private property
completes the human personality; it is a
right and therefore an obligation. So
much so that we think it should be viewed
as a social function.'*^
How then does Fascism reconcile this attitude
toward business and industry v/ith its avowed intention
of maintaining a rigid control over all the activities
within the state, The answer lies in the contention
that private ownership and initiative are public obli-
gations. Again, they Interpret the idea of duty in the
light of their thesis of everything directed to the
welfare of the state. For this purpose they admit that
m.easures of propaganda and education m.ay be necessary.
And if this does not succeed in enabling the business
m.an to see the light, then, say the Fascists, it is the
duty of the state to intervene:
"He who directs business should have the
responsibility for it and it is legitimate
that he should derive profits. . . . and
suffer the consequences of his mistakes. .
. . The only thing necessary is to ennoble
this egotism by proper education. . . .
that private welfare should always give way
before the general welfare and that superi-
ority of output also implies an obligation
to the community. "2
^V-Ussolinl, B., The Corporate State
, 1937, p. 32.
^Lichtenberger
,
H., The Third Reich
,
1937, p. 233.
I
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And
,
"It is only when various categories fail to
coire to an agreement or to establish the
proper balance that the State may intervene,
although the State always has the undisputed
power to do so.'’l
It is plainly evident from the above that the state
has obtained limitless latitude for intervention as it
sees fit. It has also been the experience in Italy and
Germany that the state has exercised this power. The
right to run one’s own business has been officially
eliminated by the state. Ironically enough, this has
proven to be the fate of not only the small business
man, but also the big industrialists who supported the
respective movements in their struggle towards politi-
cal triumph. It is true that many of the leaders of
"big business " have been retained in high positions of
author! ty--they had to be. Even Hitler and Niussolinl
could not get along without their administrative and
technical genius. But it is clear in many cases, that
while they may be better off than the small business
m.an and independent concerns, their hands have been
effectively tied by an innum.erable number of regula-
tions and a very rigid control of finance and banking.
^Mussolini, B., The Corporate State
.
1937, p. 33.
I
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They no longer have any possibility of helping to "run
the show .
"
"From a position in which, although targets
of frequent and popular attacks and general-
ly professed distrust, they wielded tremen-
dous actual power, they. , . step into the
place universally acclaimed front-rank
fighters of a battling nation, coddled with
flatter^’ and bribed with government con-
tracts--and with the privilege of mending
their backstage influences, and doing what
they are told. Moreover, this aspect of
the change is never generally known--because
some of the victims are too stupid to
realize what is happening to them, and the
others are too scared of being suspected of
non-conformity if they speak out, even in
private . "1
One mitigating influence m.ay exist. Both Hitler
and Mussolini recognize that the advance of govern-
m^ent in the field of business m.ay eventuate in such a
rigid control that all semblance of independent enter-
prise would be lost, and that bureaucracy would result.
Neither m.an wants this. They m^uch prefer that private
individuals assimne the risks attendant to any business
operation--ri sks greatly heightened by strict regula-
tion of wages, prices, and profits. They still pro-
fess to realize the essential part that the profit
motive should play in the efficient m.anagemont of the
means of production, although--in Germiany especially--
^Ashton, E. B., The Fascist ; His State and His
Mind
,
1937, p. 115
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the amount of profit is strictly limited and any excess
is automtatically ’’loaned" to the government. It is not
our place to forecast just how m.uch of a brake this
realization m.ay be, nor to predict just where govern-
mient intervention will stop. But at present indepen-
dent business in the conception of capitalism!, has
becom.e a contradiction of teirnis within the Fascist
states. .
This is the vision of the Fascist State. To
accomplish it the political m.achlne of the party has
been extended and enlarged to bring about the integra-
tion of its functions with a huge economic machine
designed and constructed to regiment all of business
and Industry. In Italy a system of actual corpora-
tions was instituted in 1934. In Germiany close coor-
dination was brought about by the establishm.ent of
Reich Ministries of Economiics, Finance, Commerce and
so forth and with the organization of a number of sub-
ordinate bureaus and departments. The Corporate State
being predicated on a thesis of hierarchy and autho-
rity, the men at the top, Mussolini and Hitler, have
not only absolute control of the political, but also
the economiic organizations. How well they have fol-
lowed the pattern of Fascism which they have designed,
and which has been outlined in the preceding pages, is
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another question. Such a program is conflicting in
many points. The supreme authority which they pos-
sess has allowed them, to further deviate as they
will. Apparently the only doctrine which can be
advanced to justify the whole contradictory plan is
the ever-present "public welfare before private
interests .
"
V
iL’f
f
i
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ITALY
The Fascist Rise to Power.
Early History . From the fall of the Roman Em^pire
until the final defeat of Napoleon III by the troops of
Victor Emmanuel in 1870 there had never been a time
when Italy could be called a nation. Its early and
medieval history was a story of city state 3--of the con-
stant conflict and struggle for supremiacy by a number of
powerful federations in Milan, Genoa, Venice, and Flo-
rence. After the suprem.acy of these cities Italy went
into an eclipse. The opening up of the Americas m.ade
the Mediterranean a back-wash of trade and activity.
Where formerly this had been the most important realm,
of industry and commierce, with its ease of access to
the ever-necessary East, the discovery and colonization
of the new lands now became the paramount concern of
the European nations in their struggle for supremacy.
The sway and domination of the city-states waned, and
with their passing went the influence of Italy in
European affairs. For the next two or three hundred
years she was continually the battleground for foreign
armies, playing paTm with the Italian cities. The
nineteenth century saw the stirrings am^ong the m.asses
for an Independent state and political unity. Of
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course, this could not be accomplished in a day. Suc-
cess was finally achieved in 1870, and Victor Emr.anuel
reigned as constitutional monarch of united Italy.
Although nationality had been consummated, the new
country was not to be envied. The union was very weak,
civil uprisings were common for som.e tim;ej and the
period between 1870 and the beginning of the World War
was exceedingly discouraging.
"The young nation had little popular tra-
dition of unity beyond the legend of
Garibaldi; differences of standard and
outlook were very m.arked, and were
enhanced by the exceedingly low level
of education."^
The weight of taxation to support the new government was
for years an alm.ost Intolerable burden and the situation
was not aided any by the armament races that existed
among the European nations before 1914. Great amounts
of money were spent prior to this tlm.e and during the
war for her armies and navies, rather than for the
development of her national resources in comr.erce, agri-
culture, and the useful arts.
With the advent of the World War, hov/ever, Italy
began to develop into a unified state in fact as well
as in name. The conflict had the effect of focussing
the national consciousness and providing a coram.on bond
~^The Econom.ic and financial position of Italy,
1935, p. 9.
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between the peoples of all parts of the country . She
tested her strength in conflict with the other great
powers of Europe and "what she saw was good." Then
came the Armistice with its attendant disappointm^ent
to the Italian people.
"iVhile Italy received extensive terri-
tories in Europe through the peace nego-
tiations at Versailles, she believed
that she had received less than jier due
and that their economic value was slight.
Thirsting for imperialistic expansion,
she was bitter over the fact that she
had obtained no share of the colonial
empire of defeated Germany, and had been
obliged to accept only' a m.inor adjust-
m>ent of her African possessions.
"Public wrath turned in reproach against
the political regim:e . Francesco Nitti,
who was then prime minister, was not
capable to cope with the situation. He
took over direction of the governm.ent at
a tim;e when a strong hand was necessary
at the helm., and his was woefully weak.
In addition to the popular bitterness and
disillusionm.ent at the outcom.e of the war,
serious dom.estic, economic and political
problems were left in its wake."l
"The repercussion of the Russian revolu-
tion was strongly felt and comm.unist pro-
paganda was carried on without hindrance
in all parts of the country and in all
public services. Revolutionary strikes
were alm.ost endemic, and the revolu-
tionary parties were rapidly becom.ing a
serious m.enace to the stability of the
state . "2
^Subsequent historical sketch taken from Fascism
and Nationa l Socialism by M. T. Florisky, 19367 P» ^
ff., witn additional miaterlal from other sources.
^McClellan, G. B., Modern I taly
, 1933, p. 214.
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These forces clashed often and openly with the social-
ist and government groups. In industry the general
strike was a constant weapon of class warfare, and
when these failed to yield the desired results, the
workingmen assumed the right to seize the factories
and emphasize their dem.ands. In the Capitol, the
King and his cabinet miembers found themselves sup-
ported by a complacent and corrupt bureaucracy, and
im^potent to control these disorders and strikes.
Cabinet followed cabinet, and political leaders in
all parts of the country rose to add their demands
to the general tumult. Out from their rnddst appeared
Mussolini, leader of a fascist revolutionary army,
who in a few short months succeeded in formulating a
party and lifting it to a dominating position in
troubled Italy.
The Rise to Power . The origins of the Fascist
movement are found before the distressing post-war
days in Italy and go back to the "Fasci d'Azione
Kivoluzionaria'* organized in 1914 by Mussolini with
the aim of bringing the country into the war, an
action which led to his expulsion from the Socialist
Party. This early group had no distinct connection
with the later army reglm.ented by Mussolini prim.arily
to meet the threat of communism which had been gain-
14 • f
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ing ground in the country in the face of an ineffec-
tual government. ^AThile it was, in its post-war form,
a struggle against "red revolution," the early Fas-
cist movement was itself conducted by groups that
were propounding very radical doctrines. At its
inception it was primarily a protest against the
feeble and inefficient government in power, and a
strong defender of the country against the attacks
of the Communist groups for having joined in the
great war. At the outset, the m.ovem.ent was very
much disorganized and uncoordinated. It had as
many objectives as there were social groups which
would support it. Local conditions and the person-
alities of local leaders had m.uch to do in deter-
m.ining the form, of organization and the imrr.ediate
aims for which it fought. Its supporters were
largely middle-class people, intellectuals, stu-
dents, and to a lesser extent workers. It appealed
prim.arlly to the youth of the nation with its pa-
rades, uniforms, and reckless revolutionary raids.
Much as any other local leader, Mussolini
founded at Milan in March, 1919, one of these Fas-
cist groups. Like all the rest, it had no parti-
cular program except the one to be found in its
namie
,
Fascio di Combattlmento
,
which m.eant the
/
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defense of the interests of the "proletariat of the
trenches." Until 1921, Mussolini was very radical
in his stands on public questions. He advocated the
transfer of land to the peasants, eight-hour work
days, participation of labor in management problems,
confiscation of eighty-five per cent of all war pro-
fits, etc. Naturally, when he entered the politi-
cal! ring in November of 1919, these demands for
sweeping social changes turned the majorities
against him and he polled only a few thousand votes.
He merely redoubled his efforts to fight the Social-
ists who were then in power; before another year had
passed, events in the troubled country began to work
in his favor. Fear for a duplication of Russian
Bolshevism under the banner of Italian Socialism,
increasing industrial difficulties and tyrannies of
local governments all conspired to arouse the nation
against the party in power. Mussolini, of course,
had been fighting them for a long while, and m.any of
the people, reasoning thus, began to gather under
his banner. With increasing strength in his party,
he Increased his attacks on the Socialists. He
organized his Fascist! into squadrons under leaders
of their own, and for the next two years conducted a
semi-revolutionary campaign, with almost dally open
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conflict between his men and the Socialists. The
police and Government maintained a "hands-off" policy
,
which on more than one occasion seemed to favor the
assailants. The prime m.inister himself, whose poli-
tical policy was one of expediency, began to seek
the favor of this new movement, even going to the
extent of dissolving Parliament in March, 1921, and
calling for a new election. Here for the first time,
Mussolini and his followers won an important victory,
seating some thirty-four members in the new govern-
ing body
.
’.Vith the advent of some measure of political
success, Mussolini astutely realized that the time
had come when he must make more than a spontaneous,
decentralized miovement of his Fascistl. Therefore,
at a Congress in Rome in Novem-ber, 1921, the Fascist
Party was officially organized.
"At the Rornie Congress the party program
was duly accepted. In the traditional
and involved Fascist phraseology it
.
spoke of the Nation and the State,
denounced Socialism, praised labor, and
declared itself in favor of econom.lc
liberalism on the ground that the eco-
nomic activities of a nation must not
be handed over to the control of bureau-
cratic agencies. "1
^Florinsky, M. T., Fascism, and National Social -
ism
,
1936, p. 14.
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Here, too, Mussolini introduced for the first time the
dom^inant principles of hierarchy and leadership, organ-
izing the Party into almiost military elements under the
strictest of discipline, and calling for complete alle-
giance to the Party and its Leader, the Duce. To fur-
ther defeat the fast-slipping Socialist Party, Mussolini
began in 1921 to seek the support of the powerful trade
union groups which had been the backbone of the oppo-
sition. Fascist unions began to spring up over the
country, obtaining m.uch success, especially am^ong the
poorer elements of labor.
It is here at this congress in Rome that we begin
to find the first foundations of the corporate system
as it was later developed. In addition to the princi-
ple of hierarchy m.entioned above, we find declarations
that the state should be an organ for the safeguarding
of the supreme interests of the nation, that Parliam^ent
should be limited in power, and that
"corporations should be encouraged as the
expression of national solidarity, as a
means for developing production, but that
they must not submerge the individual by
arbitrarily leveling his capacities."^
The Fascist trade unions were also organized in Janu-
•^Counts, Vlllari, Rorty
,
Baker, Bolshevism, Fas -
cism, and Capitalism
,
1932, p. 72.
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ary, 1922, Into a confederation of Fascist syndical
corporations, comprising five national corporations,
and, in a revolutionary move, including the middle
and intellectual classes.
As the year 1922 went along, a steady procession
of events was fast precipitating a political show-
do’wn and the collapse of the Socialist regime. The
new elections had brought about the absence of any
parliam.entary m;ajority, with a subsequent im.potence
within this body to accomplish anything constructive.
One political crisis followed another, while within
the cabinet there was a continual procession of new
m.inisters, portfolios being merely shifted from, one
man to another with a small clique. Outside of the
capital the power of the Fascists was continually
growing. Towns and comm.unes were passing under their
control alm.ost daily. The external pressure from
these communities upon the powerless central autho-
rity was constantly becoming greater. In August,
1922, the Fascists took over the city of Milan, com-
pletely routing any Socialist opposition. Later,
Genoa, which had once been the central fortress of
the opposition, fell before the Fascist advance,
and the important Socialist publication, ^ Lavoro ,
went up in flames. As tim.e passed, it became more
1
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and more obvious that something would have to be done
to alleviate the situation and to permit the opera-
tion of some form of effective government. It was
also evident that no compromise would be acceptable
to this increasingly powerful new movement. It was
m^erely a question of how its leaders were to achieve
power
.
The March on Rome . As the certainty that they
soon were to reach a position of power became evi-
dent to the Fascist leaders, the question arose as to
how it should be accomiplished . Some of the FiOre con-
servative favored legal means to obtain control of
the governm^ent. They would have forced the resig-
nation of the Socialist prim.e m.inister and his cabi-
net and formed one of their own. Indeed, while the
Fascist arm.ies were forcing the issue, Mussolini was
offered the possibility of forming a coalition gov-
ernm.ent; but recognizing the fact that his party was
in complete control of the situation he decided to
carry the issue to its logical conclusion. In oppo-
sition to the conservative elem^ent in the Fascist
organization, a radical group favored open insurrec-
tion, and a m.arch on the capital. This suggestion
naturally m.ade a strong appeal to a great number of
Mussolini’s followers, largely composed as the party
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was of the younger eleirent. Pressure for this dramatic
step grew until the end of September, when the "March'*
was decided upon.
The revolution began as a historical fact with
the calling of a Fascist congress in Naples on October
24, 1922. 3y this time Mussolini had changed his atti-
tude toward the king, declaring that the monarchy
could have no object in opposing what "must now be
called ’the Fascist revolution.’" On the twenty-sixth
of October the actual march began, reaching and
occupying the city on the thirtieth with very little
bloodshed. Previous to this, on October 27, the
prim.e minister had presented a decree calling for the
establishment of martial law, but Victor Emmanuel,
realizing the futility of the measure, refused to
sign it. Upon reaching the city, Mussolini was called
in by the king to whom> he submitted the list for his
proposed government. It was immediately accepted, and
am.ld scenes of extraordinary fervor he was installed
as prime minister. The next day, fearing lest his
army get out of hand, he ordered its withdrawal and
demobilization. The revolution was over and he was in
complete control of the power.
Solidification of the Fascist Regime . Although
Mussolini had obtained full control of the government
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by his revolutionary tactics, he had not entirely done
away with all opposition. In spite of his stated
aversion to democratic forms of governm.ent and despite
his openly asserted favoritism of a hierarchial regime,
he began his official career as head of a coalition.
His first cabinet was made up of m.embers of several
political groups, though he proceeded to handle them
in most cases as he willed. His first concern was to
consolidate his regime. This necessitated not only
remioval of the opposition but also a close scrutiny
of the ranks of the Fascists themselves. To this end
he soon dissolved the fighting units of squadrons with
which he had attained power and in their place estab-
lished a permanent m.ilitia whose chief duties are the
defense of the regime, the preservation of order in
the realm., and, above all, strict obedience and fana-
tical devotion to the Duce.
In the reconstruction of the admilnistrative
branch of the government he proceeded somiewhat dif-
ferently. Shortly after coming to power, he called
together the legislative chamber and told it that he
possessed the power to dissolve it and govern without
its authority, but that he preferred to ask for
unlimited dictatorship for one year. By m^eans of
intimidation this was granted to him. Various methods
\f
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of pressure were now employed to persuade former office-
holders to surrender their places to men who were
favored by the Fascist powers. In other cases govern-
ing bodies were merely set aside and not consulted any-
more. Changes in the election laws were also effected,
insuring to Mussolini further consolidation of the
political strength in the hands of his party. To
assist these changes in the power of vote the Militia
•was mobilized and intimidation and corrupt practices
•were widely employed.
Despite the success of these measures a trouble-
som;e minority was returned to the Parliament, a minor-
ity that was destined by its own recalcitrance to
effect its own suppression. Prominent among the
Socialists who had been returned in the elections was
a wealthy and influential Roman who would not be
repressed. Shortly after having openly and bitterly
denounced the Fascists in a speech before the Chamiber
of Deputies he disappeared. His body was found sev-
eral days later and a number of high Fascist digni-
taries were implicated in the murder. The opposition
press became exceedingly violent in Its denunciation
of Mussolini and his immediate subordinates, while
the Socialist Deputies finally refused to even sit in
the Parliam.ent . Mussolini, after making several
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attempts to conciliate these minorities and quiet thei
criticism in the press, finally- decided that the time
had arrived when he must crush all possible opposition
He declared open war, ablj assisted by a Chamber of
Deputies fromi which all opposing forces were removed.
The press also was silenced, and at the same tim.e free
dom of speech, and of meeting and assembly was for-
bidden .
Mussolini was now determined to set himself up in
an absolute rule. For this purpose he established
special courts to deal with opinions and expressions
unfavorable to the regim.e . Far-reaching changes in
the admiinistrative organization, both locally and
centrally, were instituted. A drastic reorganization
of the provincial set-up was introduced, with terri-
torial divisions under the supervision of the loyal
Fascist leaders who are directly responsible to the
central authority in Rome. Elected mayors were
replaced by nominees of the Ministry of the Interior.
Elective provincial and m.unlcipal councils were
abolished and replaced by advisory commdttees satis-
factory to the head of the party. Throughout the
nation a strict policy of centralization has been
instituted, making every miunicipal and regional divi-
sion closely responsible to Rome. The effect that
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this has had in the control of business should be large-
ly apparent and will be revealed more fully below.
The central government itself underwent an even
greater readjustment. The King, who had been largely
a figurehead before this tim.e, was deprived of any ves-
tiges of power that might have rem.ained. Nominally he
is still king. But his retention in that position is
merely a gesture to Italy’s historical tradition and
to the Fascists’ desire for prestige. The Duce is the
actual leader, and indeed, the only leader in the nation
today. Ke is a supreme dictator. It is true that he
has a cabinet, but it is a cabinet vdiich has no autho-
rity, one whose only function is to advise when asked,
and to obey when not asked. The suprem.e legislative
and deliberative body, in theory, was instituted in
1928, the Fascist Grand Council, and is m.erely the
framiework through which J/^ussolini operates. Parlia-
ment as a functional body was replaced by this Council,
and although the Cham-ber of Deputies is still in exis-
tence, to what purpose nobody knows.
It is plain that the power which Mussolini has
received is as complete as it could possibly be.
"Through his instrument the Grand Council,
he m.ay by decree repeal, amend or enact
any law he pleases. The state is so cen-
tralized that there is no public official
who is not directly under superior autho-
rity in Rome, and who is not Imjr.edlately

- 37 -
removable. Opposition parties and groups
having been abolished, the press being
entirely governmental, and the interpre-
tation of what constitutes sedition being
extremely liberal, serious hostility to
or criticism of Fascism are impossible. ,
, . The Duce never offered to give Italy
deirocratic institutions. vVhat he did
promise was to give Italy the place to
which she was entitled in the family of
nations and to start her on the road to
financial and economiic prosperity. . . .”1
An examination of the m.easures which he emiployed to ful-
fill these promises rem.ains to be considered.
The Economiic Structure and Present
Measures of Control.
Although the Fascists came to power in 1922, Musso-
lini at that time had developed no program, of industrial
and economic coordination of his own beyond the general
principles of rigid nationalism, and hierarchy which he
had continually declared during his political rise.
True he had organized his own Fascist trade union, or
syndicates, but this was as much to com.bat the suprem.acy
of the Socialists in the labor field as it was to develop
the corporate idea. The strength of these syndlcal
organizations naturally increased with the m.ight of the
party in the ensuing years, as did also the power of
the General Fascist Confederation of Industry' which wasV
^MicClellan, G. B., Modern Italy
,
1933, p. 251.
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organlzed. Priirarily, however, the Diace’s concern for
the first few years was for the consolidation of his
political regime. It was not until 1926 that the
first step in the construction of the Italian Corpo-
rate State as we know it today was introduced.
The Corporate Structure . As it is constituted
today the corporate structure in Italy has been pro-
duced by a series of several law over a period of
nine years. The first of these was enacted on April
3, 1926, relating to the legal regulation of collec-
tive labor relations, and is amplified by the Decree
of July 1, 1926. Then followed the Labor Charter of
April 21, 1927, which is actually not a law but a set
of principles on which Italian labor legislation is
based, or should be based, in the future. On March
20, 1930, appeared the Law on the Reform of the Na-
tional Council of Corporations which for the first
tim.e formed an offical link between the interests of
business and the interests of labor. Finally the New
Corporations Law, which had been awaited since it was
promised in the Charter of Labor made its appearance
t
on February 5, 1934. By this series of laws the
existing labor system and the Italian Corporate State
1
have been set up. To explain the system thus estab-
lished, it is preferable to set down the main insti-
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tutions on which it is based, rather than to attempt to
exam.ine each of the legislative steps one by one.
Legally" recognized Syndicates. Starting at the
bottom of this com.plex industrial structure we find
associations known as syndicates organized on a trade
basis. Thus for every profession or trade within cer-
tain designated districts, twin syndicates--one for the
employers and one for the employees--are formed and may
secure legal recognition. A Royal Decree is granted upon
the fulfillment of several conditions. A legally
accepted association must be able to show that it
represents at least ten per cent of the workers of its
particular trade or category, and within the specified
district. The association must not only represent its
m.embers in industrial negotiations, but it must also
perform
"functions of an educational character; it
should promote the m*oral
,
technical and
patriotic education of its members. It
should further provide for social services,
sick benefits, etc."^
Members and officers m^ust show evidence of "sure nation-
ri 2
al faith. ^ When it receives legal recognition the
association becomes the sole representative of all the
^Counts, Villarl, Rorty, Baker, Bolshevism, Fascism
,
and Capitalism
, 1932, p. 81.
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workers within its category, whether they are irembers
or not. It also has the right to assess all workers
for dues to ireet the expenses of the organization.
It should be noticed that non-official syndicates
are not expressly forbidden. However, as they carry
no weight before the law and may not legally represent
their members, they have alm.ost ceased to exist. The
advantages of membership in official syndicates are
obviously so much greater, that it is probable that
within a few more years all ^ facto organizations
will have vanished.
The purpose of the whole system of corporate
agencies in Italy was to do away with labor troubles
and class conflict. The chief function of the recog-
nized syndicates therefore becom.es the negotiation
of collective labor contracts, affecting the best
possible arrangements for their members in the light
of the Fascist doctrine of the "welfare of the nation
before the interests of individuals." When it is
im.possible to reach a satisfactory conclusion to both
the interests of capital and labor, their respective
syndicates m.ay carry the issues before the Labor
Courts which have been especially designed to settle
such disputes. Decisions by these bodies are final.
Under no consideration is class warfare with its
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attendant labor strikes and Industrial lock-outs per-
mitted’.
The syndicates also have the entire control of
em.ployment , Offices are attached to the local workers’
syndicates. Employers are required to hire through
these bureaus, and workers must register with these
offices when they become unemployed. Heavy fines are
the penalties for infractions of these regulations.
Employers are also required to accept the workers who
are sent to them by the employment office, preference
naturally being shown to Fascist Party affiliates.
Provincial Unions, National Federations, National
Confederations . The local syndicates are in turn
grouped under larger organizations, forming the basis
of a pyram.id which comprises provincial or district
unions, then national federations and finally national
confederations. As in the local syndicates a twin
organization is set up, comprising two such pyramids--
one for the employers and one for the workers. Obvi-
ously the purpose of these larger organizations is the
pursuance of affairs and interests beyond the scope of
the local groups. The national federations are comi-
prised of provincial syndicates of workers or em.ployers
engaged in the same form* of industrial activity. The
member of national confederations, however, has been
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liicited to nine since the Law of February 5, 1934. Thus
there is one national confederation of eirployers and one
national confederation of employees for each of four
major fields of particular activity; i. e., for industry,
agriculture, commerce, and banking and insurance. The
ninth national confederation comprises a siirilar organ-
ization for artists and professional men.
"Each confederation has the following
organs
;
"1. The national congress, composed
of delegates of the various provincial and
Interprovincial associations forming a
part of it, selected for each congress in
numbers proportionate to the number of
miemhers of each member-association and in
accordance with its statutes. The president,
the members of the governing body of the
confederation, and the heads of the national
unions and syndicates, are ^ jure members
of the congress. The congress m.eets every
three years, or oftener if necessary.
"2. The governing body, com.posed of
representatives of national category organ-
izations and one representative of the
National Association of War Disabled. The
governing body carries out the decisions
of the national congress and conducts
business between m.eetings of the latter.
"3. The presidency, whose occupant
is appointed by the congress and approved
by the proper authorities."^
These organizations constitute the main institu-
tions for the representation of employers and workers
^Counts, Vallari, Rorty
,
Baker, Bolshevism., Fas -
cism. and Capitalism
, 1932, p. 89.
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under the Fascist economic structure. The principal
function of the local syndicates was the conclusion of
collective contracts between the associations of
employers and employees. These functions and the cor-
porate liaison organs which Mussolini set up to faci-
litate such negotiations remain to be studied. '/Vhile
it is obvious that strict regulations have been imposed
upon the syndicates and confederations, m.aking them
entirely^ subservient to the political elem.ents in Romie,
it is through these latter organizations that Mussolini
has achieved the fullest control of business.
Collective Labor Contracts . Collective labor
contracts are nothing new in this country or in Italy.
F’ormierly, however, they were concluded over there only
after long days of bitter wrangling and conflict, and
too often it v/as the stronger party which dictated the
terms. They were binding only upon those who had
directly agreed to them., and very frequently circumvented
if they proved to be unsatisfactory. Today this is the
com.pulsory means of negotiation, since strikes and lock-
outs are prohibited. These contracts are binding not
only upon the members of the syndicates but also upon
all workdrs of the specific category affected. They
are applicable to the whole of Italy and thus even the
iV
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most backward areas are affected.
For contracts to be valid they must fulfill cer-
tain conditions. They must have been stipulated by the
properly qualified associations and in the proper form.
Som.etimes the consent of corresponding associations
above them is necessary. The contracts generally must
be comprehensive in their application to all the
workers engaged in any particular pursuit, and they
must give some assurance that they are so drawn up as
to insure a measure of permanency in the relations of
the affected parties.
In general, these contracts cover the customary
m.atters such as its own duration, disciplinary regu-
lations, wages, hours of work, methods of payment,
weekly holidays, annual vacations, cases of dismissal
through no fault of the worker, the transfer of a
business from, one em.ployer to another, the treatment
and relief of workers in case of illness and of
absence on account of militarv service.
The Ministry of Corporations in Rome, which is
directly answerable to Mussolini, must give his
approval to the labor contract and it m.ust be published
before it becomes a valid instrum.ent. 'Awhile collective
contracts have becom.e the official means of negotiation
between the interests of the workers and of the manage-
)
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merit, private as^reements are not entirely precluded.
However, to be acceptable these agreements must be
not less favorable to labor than is the existing
collective contract.
Labor Courts . The primary purpose of compul-
sory collective labor contracts has been the elimina-
tion of class strife and warfare. Fascism has always
contended that strikes and lock-outs and other simi-
lar differences between the interests of management
and workers are nothing less than high treason to the
state and an elevation of the welfare of individuals
over that of the nation. It was realized, of course,
that no system., no matter how perfect, could do away
with labor disputes entirely, and that there would be
m.any occasions when the syndicates would not be able
to reach an agreement concerning a contract. Direct
action by management and labor being precluded, the
Fascists proceeded to introduce an entirely new
mechanism into the problem of industrial relations,
i. e.. Labor Courts. These institutions are attached
to every district court of appeal and consist of
three judges. The judges are assisted by two experts
selected from a list approved by the government.
Conciliation is always the first procedure in
any dispute. This element is strongly stressed, and
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it is only when a decision cannot be reached through
the mediation of the associations or of the Ministry
of Corporations that these Labor Courts are resorted
to. Even when disputes come before the courts, a
final attempt is made to reconcile the differences
before legal m.easures are taken.
The Labor Courts judge in cases where diffi-
culty has arisen in the conclusion of a collective
labor contract. They m,ay also rule between differ-
ent categories of workers and em.ployers concerning
the observance and application of laws, and on pro-
visions arising out of a modification of the term.s
of a contract when dem.anded by either side. Where
the law is clear they must judge accordingly. They
are, however, fundam.entally courts of equity. There-
fore there arise many cases where they m.ust decide
problems of fair wages and hours (always bearing in
mind the necessity of a living wage to the worker),
the economiic ability of the producer, and always
the prim.ary interest of production and the national
society
.
Decisions of the Labor Court are binding on all
parties concerned. It is regarded that they have
had ample opportunity to reach a decision by concili-
ation, and having failed, they are required to accept
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the decisions of the courts. Controlled as they are
by political superiors, it is the opinion of several
writers that these courts too often decide cases with
political considerations forerr.ost, instead of giving
the proper attention to the economic Interests and
problems involved.
The Corporations. The system of syndicates,
provincial unions, national federations, and national
confederations, as it has been outlined above, is
obviously one of vertical organization for the worker
and for the employers. Points of contact are estab-
lished in the subordinate associations by means of
collective contracts, and where these have not been
concluded, by the Labor Courts. It is evident that
it would be im.possible to extend these m.easures to
the broad national federations and confederations
where problems of national scope and general policy
preclude such Im.plemients . To solve this problem the
Fascist State invents the fundamental organ of the
Corporate State--a system of nine liaison associa-
tions designed to coordinate all the factors and
interests of production with the prim.ary interest of
the state .
The National Council of Corporation first
appeared as an Advisory body in 1926, under the Minis
'1
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try of Corporations. From this time on we find refer-
ences to the corporation and to the purposes for which
it was to be constructed. The Decree of July 1, 1926,
mentions the corporations as a means of uniting the
"national syndical organs of the several factors of
production," and describes it further as an organ of
state administration constructed for the purpose of
"promoting, encouraging, and subsidizing all initi-
ative which is designed to coordinate and improve
production." The charter of Labor, published in 1927,
also describes the corporations as associations which
"constitute the unifying organization
of the elem.ents of production (capital
and labor) and represent the com*m,on
interests of all. Sy virtue of this
joint representation, and since the
interests of production are the inter-
ests of the Nation
,
the Corporations
are recognized by law as organs of the
State . "1
In 1930, by the Law of March 20, the advisory
status of the National Council of Corporations was
altered and this body was created as the first offi-
cial link between the syndicates of the em.ployers and
the syndicates of employees. Mussolini, as Minister
of Corporations, became its head. The Council exe-
^Einzig, Paul,
c i sm.
,
1934, p. 126.
The Econom.ic Foundations of Fas-
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cuted advisory and regulatory powers for three years,
after which time it v/as decided that further reforms
and an even more powerful organization was necessary.
For this purpose the Law of February 5, 1934 was
created. Here for the first time the long-promised
corporations were authorized, and under the provisions
of the law put into effect. By this law tv/enty-two
corporations were set up, covering every phase of
economic activity. Their purpose, as was mentioned
above, is to assure uninterrupted and coordinated
national production, organized in the m.ost efficient
and satisfactory manner to secure the national wel-
fare. Or, as Mussolini defines them, the corpora-
tions are
"instruments which, under the aegis of
the State, carry out the complete organic
and Unitarian regulation of production
with a view to the expansion of the
wealth, political power, and well-being
of the Italian people .... The num-
ber of Corporations to be formed for
the m.ain branches of production should,
on principle, be adequate to m.eet the
real needs of national economy.
Mussolini continues to declare that the general
staff of each corporation should include representa-
tives of the state administration of the Fascist party.
^Mussolini, B., The Corporate State
,
1937, p. 9
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of capital and of labor. He assigns to the corpora-
tions the tasks of
"conciliation, consultation (compul-
sory on problem.s of m:ajor im-portance )
,
and the promulgation, through the
National Council of Corporations, of
laws regulating the economic activi-
ties of the countr^^."^
Specifically the council of each corporation is under
the direction of a m.eraber of the Duce’s cabinet, a
secretary attached to the State departm.ent
,
or the
Secretary of the Fascist Party. This president is
the appointee of the Head of the Government, who is
also chairman of the National Council of Corporations.
I'ember representatives are elected by the associated
confederations, but they must be approved by Musso-
lini after receiving the recomm.endation of the Minis-
ter of Corporations. The governing board of each
corporation is assisted by a group of technical
experts, as well as representatives of the Govern-
micnt and the Party
.
JVhile the confederations and other subordinate
organizations represent the joint interests of an
entire class of management or labor, the purpose of
these corporations is to unite both groups in a par-
ticular branch of business or industry. For this pur-
iMussolini, B., The Corporate State
,
1937, p. 9.
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pose tv/enty-tv/o separ&te corporations were deemed neces
sary
.
"Thej^ were subdivided according to the
'cycle of production’ into three
classes: (1) corporations connected
with agriculture, industry and commerce;
(2) corporations connected with industry
and commerce; and (3) corporations con-
nected with the services,”!
The functions of these groups is to study conflicts of
interest, possibilities of expansion, all possible means
of an increase and improvement in production, and reduc-
tion of costs.
”The Council is also intrusted with the
duty of coordinating the interests of
the various branches of trade; this is
a particularly imiportant provision, and
implies the settling of such conflicts
as may arise, as for Instance between
agriculture and Industry, or between
two or m.ore rival Industrie s . ”2
The possible extent of state intervention in busi-
ness under such a system is lim.itless. The Fascists,
however, have steadfastly m.aintained that they were not
discarding the principles of private ownership and pri-
vate initiative in favor of an extrem.e nationalism.
Signor Bottal, former Minister of Corporations, said in
1929 when he was proposing the National Council of Cor-
^Florlnsky, K. T., Fascism^ and National Socialism,
1936, p. 92.
^Counts, Villari, Rorty, Baker, Bolshevism, Fas -
cism, and Cepitalism.
, 1932, p. 98.
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porations that this body was to be a national organ of
the state designed to hold the balance between the syn-
dicates and private enterprise. He v/ent on to say that
private enterprise, syndlcal activity, corporate acti-
vity and state intervention were each essential to the
proper coordination of Italian industry. Mussolini
likewise has said that it is the purpose of the state
to allow business and industry to pursue their own
courses as long as the interests of the nation are not
jeopardized, although retaining the right of the Govern-
ment to intervene at any time that it should happen to
choose to do so.
Despite these declarations, how great has been the
necessity’- for effective control over the activities of
business and industry is apparent from a survej" of the
political relations within the corporate system*. At
every phase the influence of the Fascist State is evi-
dent. The syndicates receive from, the State the right
of sole recognition for managem.ent and labor if they
can show evidence of "sure national faith," although
they may comprise only ten per cent of the workers of
their category. A Royal Decree confers this right.
Em.ployrcent is entirely syndicalized . The collective
contracts which the associations negotiate becom.e the
only instrum.ent for bargaining of all of labor, and
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even these contracts are subject to the approval of the
Minister of Corporations and must be published in the
official Gazette before they become active. National
federations and national confederations are subject to
similar measures of control. Thus both parties in labor
disputes are represented in negotiations by presidents
and secretaries who, although "elected," must also be
confirmed in office by the Government. Judges in the
Labor Courts are likewise political appointees. The
experts who assist the judges are selected from care-
fully prepared lists of Fascist supporters. The
National Council of Corporations has as its direct
head the Minister of Corporations, which happens to be
liussolini. Each of the corporations in its turn must
include representatives of the administration and of
the Fascist Party on its general staff, and even the
member representative of the interests of emiployers and
employees m-ust receive the sanction of the Ministry.
In this corporate system Mussolini has constructed
an instrument for control of business that has no limit.
By this machine state intervention becomes a continual
fact rather than a policy of expediency. The power of
the Fascist organization extends through its control of
the corporate structure down to the sm.allest industrial
concern and so-called Independent retail store. flhile
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the ovmer may still call his business his own, he no
longer has the privilege of operating it in the v/ay
which to him seem.s most likely to return a profit. Ke
m.ust nov; be ever attentive to the primary concern of the
Party and of the State, else he will soon discover that
he has no business. ”31g business” too has not escaped
the control of the political interests. It has been
regim.ented by the syndical-corporative structure as
rigidly as has any other phase of industry. True that
in many cases Mussolini has had to retain technical
experts and business geniuses in positions which have
allov/ed them, somiev/hat more freedom, yet the corporate
structure has adequately provided all the m.easures of
intervention which the government has found necessary.
The coordination of business activities in Italy,
in the form of the Corporate State, does not entirely
complete the picture of the restrictive mieasures and
prohibitions which have fallen upon industry, banking,
and trade. It should be noticed at the outset that
these supplem.entary regulations and restrictions are not
an essential feature of the Fascist ideology, but have
been necessitated in part by the econom.ic crises which
have existed throughout the world, and in part by the
cevelopm.ent of internal econom.ic situations as Italy
has attem-pted to achieve autarchy.
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General Business . Ever since it first carre tc
power the Fascist regime has been faced with one eco-
nomic crisis after another, and the measures of com.bat
which it has had occasion to em:ploy are not entirely
Fascist in their origins. Considering the ’fact that
there already existed such a m.achlne as the Corporate
system ready for use, it is not surprising that many of
the measures have been made tc conform, to the Fascist
pattern since they first appeared. Others of these
have not been expected to conform, but have through
necessity been retained until economic security and
autarchy, if it can be attained, have been reached.
An innumberable number of regulations and prohibi-
tions have been necessary for specific businesses and
industries since the advent of the world-v/ide depres-
sion of the past decade. Coupled to this factor, and
of course greatly occasioned by it, have been declines
in foreign trade and severe exchange difficulties. To
combat these elem.ents, further restrictions have been
im.posed upon various types of business pursuits such
as imiportlng and exporting and the industries dependent
upon foreign raw m.aterials.
Between the jears 1926 and 1933 fourteen institu-
tions were organized and have continued to remain in
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force, The purposes of these organizations have been
varied, and have concerned themselves primarily with the
stimulation of business in specific fields. They have
been designed, among other things,
"to promote exports, encourage industrial
development, regulate and promote busi-
ness, rescue the national silk industry,
promote standardization and agreements
in industry, support the textile, miarble,
rice, shipping, and sulphur industries,
and liquidate frozen assets and indus-
trial credits."^
An innumerable number of institutions have followed,
each with its own particular reason for existing. The
result was a confusion of aims and interests, with a
large amount of overlapping, and an entirely uncoordi-
nated system.
Bureaucracy received a further impetus in the
Italian state by a regim.entation of some of the large-
scale industries which amounted finally to direct com.-
pulsions. Apropos of this subject, Mussolini, in the
face of the Ethiopian war, proclaimed the nationaliza-
tion of large-scale industries working for war purposes,
and in 1937 took over ship-building. According to
decrees which were issued, iron and steel industries
were required to unite into national comibines, coal
^Tracy, M. E.
,
Our Country, Cur People, and
Theirs
,
1933, p. 40.
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and industrial metals were made state monopolies, and
subsidization of many other industries and concerns in
distress was consummated. In addition, holders of
foreign securities were required to convert them, into
governm.ent bonds, stock dividends were limited, indivi-
dual savings were used to support the national bond
market, and export of Italian currency and securities
was forbidden. Other nev/ corporations v;ere set up to
stimulate theater and film production, to promiote con-
sumption of agricultural products, and to protect such
other industries as the fisheries, vineyards and wines,
the textiles, m.achiner^’’ and m.ines, and the professions
and arts.
One of the most severe regulations was imiposed by
the Ministry of Corporations upon the industry in a
decree which was published in 1934. By this edict, the
government prohibited the building of new plants or the
expansion of old ones, without the sanction of the Min-
istry. This regulation was designed to create m.arkets--
and not to curtail them--by preventing over-production
and rem.oving unfair com.petition
. The government expects
by means of this regulation to be able to tighten or
relax its control of industrial development at will.
In the utility fields nationalization of business
is m.ore common. Most of the railroads were nationalized
/
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before the Fascists came to power. In 1905 the govern-
ment took over the greater lines in the country, leav-
ing about one-fourth in the hands of private concerns.
Since the advent of Fascism the trend has been toward
complete government ovmership, and the day is probably
not too far distant when this will be accomplished. In
the m.erchant m.arine, which was for a time at a very low
ebb, the government has entered with a plicy of subsi-
dization, and has succeeded in restoring somie m.easure
of prosperity. Communications are both privately and
publicly owned; the post, telegraph and cable services
are owned and operated outright by the government. The
telephone service was government-o’/raed until 1923. At
that time it was leased to private companies, except
for a few international and inter-urban lines. In the
field of radio the Fascist regim.e has developed the
industry from its infancy. Although it was the hom.e of
Marconi, Italy had done little v/ith radio up to 1927.
At that tim.e the government took steps to expand the
industry. In 1933 there were sixteen long-wave and one
short-wave broadcasting stations in the country. Where
the government does not own and operate them outright,
they are subject to rigid state control.
Banking and Finance . As we have already pointed
out, the effect of the depression, together with the
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attempt of the Fascists to achieve national autarchy,
has been the irajor influence in deterniming economic
and financial policies in Italy during the past few
years. The measures to which they have had recourse
are often no different from those which we have seen
instituted in democratic nations. High tariff barriers,
government subsidies for industries and shipping,
export and import quotas, public v/orks constructed by
public funds, credit expansion, unbalanced budgets,
and currency manipulations are not steps which have
been confined solely to the Fascist states. But on the
other hand, many of the m.easures which have been insti-
tuted in Italy have been designed to increase the con-
trol of banking by the political forces.
In the afterm.ath of the crash, the banks in Italy,
as in other countries, were in dire straits. And, as
elsewhere, the state stepped in to render assistance to
them. This was in accordance with the fundamental Fas-
cist principle of assuring the welfare of the public by
state intervention. Several measures for this purpose
were adopted. Besides assistance extended to indivi-
dual banking concerns, the Govermr.ent created two other
financial Institutions, the Institute Mobiliare Itali-
ano and the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale.
The first of these institutions is intended to relieve
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banks of huge amounts of shareholdings of industrial con-
cerns which they had acquired in pre-depression days.
Although this operation resulted in the desired increase
of the liquid resources of the banks, it largely led to
a replacement of shares by government securities. It
also made the state-controlled institution the sharehol-
der of most of the leading industrial concerns of the
country, thus providing another means of supervision.
The second institution was created by the Governm.ent to
provide additional funds for the refinancing of indus-
trial enterprises, where banking resources had proved
inadequate. ’iVhen it was decided that private initia-
tive in the sphere of banking was proving insufficient
to m.eet the changing situations of the depression, the
Italian government also considered it necessary to
enter directly the financial field. To this end, it
created a number of state and semi-state institutions
to supplement the private concerns.
The Fascist regime also exerts a very close control
over the entire sphere of banking through the interme-
diary of the Corporation of Banks and Insurance Compa-
nies. The authorities have used their powers in a
dictatorial manner, and banks are sometimes required to
follow a policy entirely opposed to the principles upon
which they were founded. Although the banks are not
','V i' - ' ' i
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nationalized, the control by the state could hardly be
greater If they were. Banks have been required to pro-
vide their surplus funds for support of the government
bond m.arket, and for the financing of public works
undertaken by the Fascist regime. In the realm, of
foreign trade, control over holdings of foreign secu-
rities and currency has also been concentrated in the
hands of the Bank of Italy, and, since 1935, in those
of the Superintendent of Foreign Exchanges. Export and
imiport licenses and the lim'itations of trade by quotas
has also been found necessary.
With the present system, based especially on the
laws of 1926 and the subsequent intorduction of the cor-
porate structure,
"the opening of the new banks or even of
branches is subject to state authorization,
which is not granted unless there be cer-
tain conditions with regard to capital and
promoters. Operations of all kinds are
controlled by special rules applying to
the collection of deposits, the opening of
credits, the building up of reserves,
amalgamiations and transformations. Peri-
odical control is exercised by the Bank
of Finance, who guarantee the application
of the existing laws.
"Institutes of Agrarian Credit are subject
to the control of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture in virtue of the law of 1932. They
are generally of limited size, but their
task is an important one insofar as they
collect savings from., and distribute cre-
dits to agriculture, in districts far re-
moved fromi banking and financial centers."^
^Marplcati, A., The Achievements of Fascism
, 1935, p. 44.
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GERWANY
The Fascist Rise to Power.
Early History . The picture of a unified Germany
begins with the ascendency of the Prussian state under
the Illustrious leadership of its Chancellor, Bismiarck,
in the year 1871. Previous to this time Germany had
been a land of hundreds of little states and principa-
lities, each with their own ruling houses and leaders.
Austria alone had been able to attain any degree of
power, conquering som.e of the small neighboring states,
and setting herself up as the center of an Austrian
Empire. However, as the years wore on in the latter
half of the eighteenth century, certain other of these
principalities began to absorb their weaker neighbors
and to attain positions of leadership. Forem.ost amiong
these was Prussia, which under the discipline and hard
work of the Eohenzollerns first assum.ed a challenging
position to Austrian supremiacy. At the turn of the
century, Napoleon also added his contribution to the
unification of the German state, conquering Prussia and
scores of the smaller independent states and uniting
them under his rule. After his defeat, this union held,
setting the stage for the em*ergence of a unified Germ.any,
Bismarck became Minister President of the Prussian
1'
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governnent In 1362 and at once set about creating a
powerful federation of the German states under Prussian
leadership. His problem, he realized, was the opposi-
tion which France and Austria 7/ould offer. He therefore
proceeded to pick quarrels, first with Austria and then
with France. Defeating both opponents with remarkable
ease, the way was now cleared for a unified Gerrrian state.
This was accomplished in the peace treaty at the end of
the Franco-Prussian War, and on January 13, 1971, the
German Empire was proclaimed, with William I, King of
Prussia, as Emperor.
Betv/een the years 1371 and 1914, Germany made pro-
digious progress on a] 1 fronts. Naturally a thorough and
energetic people, they mastered the problem: of sustaining
a nation of sixty-five millions on the sam.e area where, in
the first part of the centur^^, twenty-five millions had
been poorly supported. Germ.an application and study of
Industrial problem.s was carried on with a diligence and
concentration which has becom^e a byword since that time.
The nation was thoroughly industrialized and transformed
from a poor agrarian country into a highly unified com-
mercial state. Her scientists and scholars made dis-
coveries that placed them foremost in their fields
throughout the world
.
She entered the colonial picture, acquiring a 'scat-
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tered empire from among the few lands yet unclaimed among
the nations. To protect this colonial empire she built
up her merchant marine and her nav^’-
.
iProud of her progress in all lines, the German peo-
ple began to develop a theory of nationalism and racial
superiority which has remained until the present day and
has becom.e one of the vital ideologies of Hitler's regime.
The idea that war has a civilizing effect fitted in well
with this theory, so the Emperor further increased his
navy and built up the armiy until it was the most power-
ful in the world.
Then came the ,Vorld War. For three years it seem^ed
as if Germany would v/in, before the change in fortunes
came. Amxerica with her m.ight in men and money .loined
with the Allies. Britain’s blockade became more effec-
tive. At hom.e and at the front the Germans were unable
to get food and other vital supplies. The armies began
to fall back. The navy was finally routed decisively
in one huge engagem.ent. Behind the lines disillusioned
political leaders and a "worn-out” working group were
talking revolution. In the face of circumstances defeat
was certain, and Germany finally surrendered on November
18
,
1918 .
The Rise to Pov/er. To understand how National
Socialism; was evolved it is necessary to realize the
f
,
s
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conditlons which existed in Germany at the time of the
Treaty of Versailles and during the existence of the
Weimar Republic which followed.
At the close of the War, the German people were
stunned by defeat. For three years it had looked as
though they were going to win. They had been taught
this in their schools and churches and hom.es. Every
fam.ily had m.emibers who had been killed or wounded at the
front. Every fam.ily had sacrificed to the lim.it in food
and other necessities to support the miilitary machine,
'flfhen affairs began to go against the army, this fact was
kept from them until the last minute. It was not until
the General Staff confessed its weakness and asked for
the conclusion of an immediate arm.istice that everything
in Berlin collapsed. Then it was that the truth of
defeat first appeared to the people, although to them it
still seemed impossible. It represented the crumbling
of the entire world as they had known it. What the
future could bring was as doubtful as the past had been
vain. Under the stress of spiritual crisis and readjust
ment it was only natural to look about for excuses for
defeat. Gradually they--and Adolf Hitler am.ong them--
evolved a more flattering explanation to offer: It was
the traitors back home who had been responsible for
defeat. The arm.ies would have been invincible in battle
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It was the Socialists in the Government, and the Jews,
who had sold out the country and brought about the
downfall of the Reich.
Coupled with this spirit among the German people was
the effect of the Treaty of Versailles. Under its provi-
sions Germany was made to accept full blame for the war,
she was saddled with heavy reparations, her arn-.aments
were limited, and her colonial empire was divided among
the victorious Allies. Every nation had been allowed to
register its dem.ands; only Germany had had nothing to say.
To a people who felt justified in the fight that they had
waged, this was intolerable. It filled them with a hatred
of the treaty and of the men who had drawn it up. The
bitterness of defeat was intensified and the way was
opened for the spreading of Communism and any other radi-
cal doctrines in the wake of disillusionm.ent
.
One of the provisions which the victorious nations
had laid upon Germany was that it must repudiate the
Em.peror and set up a dem.ocratic form of governmiCnt . The
Kaiser had been exiled to Holland, and many other of the
Germ^an princes had followed him. across the border. In
the days that followed, a constitutional assembly was
called at Weimar and the republic formed. The document
which this assembly produced has been called the most
dem.ocratic in the world. Unfortunately it was foredoomed
3j
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to fall-are. The people had been too lone; educated in the
ideology of the Lmpire to easily cast aside these doc-
trines and accept the institutions of democracy. The men
'
-who were asked to assume the leadership of the new repub-
lic had had little experience in public office. They were
!
confronted with problems which would have been m.ore than
^
the most astute statesman would have sought. Ham.pered
I
by the provisions of the Treaty, and pressed by the Allies
j
to meet huge indemnities, Germany went from one crisis to
I
another. Inflation set in and wiped out the savings of
' the m.iddle and upper classes. Unemployment spread though-
t
> out the land and threw millions out of their jobs.
Politically the Social Dem.ocrats were Incompetent to
j
cope with all these problems. They were opposed by the
y
German Communist Party which had been gaining in popu-
! larity as the dislike of the masses for the party in
power increased. Looking about for support, the Social
Democrats retained many of the officers and statesmen of
the former Imperial set-up. In Parliament political dis-
sension grew. Instead of legislating the factions fought
each other, and laws had to be decreed by the President
and the Cabinet.
It was in the m.iddle of this turmoil and dlsillu-
sionm.ent that the parties opposed to the Republic began
' to grow and gain supporters. Of these, the one which
7
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grew the fastest, and eventually wiped out the Weimar
Republic, was the party headed by Eitler, the National
Socialist German Workers Party.
The beginnings of the Hitler movement go back to
the days just after the war. Hitler, an Austrian German
who had fought valiantly for his country, was bitterly
disappointed at defeat. He continued to believe in the
invincibility of the German army and m.aintained that it
had been betrayed by the political Interests at hom.e
.
In the days after the war
"Hitler was apparently just another one of
the millions of form^er soldiers, without
mioney
,
without a real job. But he was also
a burning patriot, and wanted to do some-
thing to m.ake Germany strong. One night in
1919 he happened to attend a small m.eeting
in Munich sponsored by a smiall local group--
the German Labor Party. . . . Eitler was
invited to join and accepted.
He now decided to take this little group in hand. He
becam.e its leader and on February 24, 1920, drafted a
program* of twenty-five points. This was the beginning
of the present National Socialist German Workers Party.
The early growth of the new party was not specta-
cular. In 1923 it was but one of several such groups
opposed to the policies of the party in power. In num-
bers it could boast of only six thousand followers. In
^Stone, S., Shadow Over Europe
,
1938, p. 39.
1
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November of 1923 Hitler participated, with General Lunen-
dorff, in a rebellion in Munich against the Reich. The
putsch had no chance to succeed. 'JVhen it was quelled
Hitler was confined to prison and the Party outlawed.
It seemed as though National Socialism had been wiped out
of existence.
However this was not the case.
"Hitler came to the conclusion that he had
committed two tactical blunders in the
Munich revolt, and set about to remedy
them. Henceforth, he determined to go
more slowlv and be sure of the m.eans at
•/
his commiand; further, he decided that he
had failed because he had used extra-
legal means.
In order to win Germ.any it was necessary not to use force,
but to gain the confidence of the people and be chosen by
the vote of the nation as dictator. Accordingly, he reor-
ganized his party upon his release from prison in 1924.
Progress in the political field for the next five years
was slow. In the elections of May, 1928, his party polled
only 800,000 votes and won only eight seats in the Reich-
stag. Their ally, the German People's Party was practi-
cally wiped out. In 1929, however, the tide began to
turn in his favor. The world crash which occured this
year sent the millions who were out of work in Germany into
^Lichtenberger
,
H., The Third Reich
, 1937, p. 26.
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the ranks of the extremists. Hitler's sympathy for this
group attracted many of them to his party.
The national Socialism! of these days also attracted
the youth of Germany. It had always m.aintained that it
was a movem^ent of young Germany;
"and, by 1930, the children .of the war years
had gro’wn to m.anhood. They had grown up,
too, at a time when the country, as we have
seen, was passing through a period of
extrem.ely painful readjustment. They had
lived through miany hardships. . . . The
m.ilitant character of the Hitler movem.ent
,
its thrills and novelty, its uniforms, fist
fights with the police and ComiTiunists
,
and
all of its heroic trappings and phraseology
appealed irresistibly to the Germ.an charac-
ter. ... In contrast with the venerable
and aging Hindenburg and the mediocrity of
the leaders of the Weimar Republic, Hitler
appeared to many to be the mian of Destiny."!
Hence it is no wonder that the movement began to grow
and assume proportions which, within a year or two more,
made it a factor to be reckoned with in the Reichstag.
In the elections for this body in September, 1930, the
National Socialists obtained 6.5 million votes and 307
seats. With this first show of political might. Hitler’s
star remained in ascendancy. In the spring of 1932, he
challenged Hindenburg for the presidency, obtaining 11.3
m.illion votes, but losing out to the eighty-five year
old war hero. From, the July elections of the sam.e year.
^Florinsky
,
M. T., Fascism and National Socialism,
1936, p. 44.
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however, the National Socialists emerged as far the
strongest political party in the Reichstag. By this
election they received 230 seats as opposed to the 153
which the Social Democrats obtained.
In the fall of 1932, they received a set-back when
several seats were lost to the Communist Party. There
followed anxious mionths when it seemed that the bubble
was about to burst. But at the last moment, a group
of industrialists, with whom the President was associated,
and East Prussian landowners, who had misspent government
funds and feared exposure, convinced Hindenburg that the
country could only be saved from^ Bolshevism, if Hitler
were appointed Chancellor. Previous to this time Hitler
had been offered. the opportunity to participate in a
coalition but had refused to join any government of which
he was not the head. It was believed that he had m.issed
his chance and that the party was now bound to fall to
pieces. But such was not the case. Thanks to the inter-
vention of these financial interests he received another
opportunity, and on January 30, 1933, Hitler was appointed
Chancellor of the Reich.
Solidification of the Fascist Regime . Hitler imme-
diately proceeded to establish himself in his new posi-
tion as leader of the German people. He declared war on
the other political parties which had been opposing him.
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"In a declaration at this tiire he states that
the Marxist parties had been given fourteen
years to show what they could do. They had
destroyed the spiritual unity of the country,
ruined the peasant class and brought terrible
conditions of unemployment. He now proposed
to remedy all of these evils and to restore
a healthy financial and economic situation
within the next four years.
His first step in this direction was to obtain from
Hindenburg a decree calling for the dissolution of the
Reichstag on the grounds that the nation should have the
right to declare itself toward the new regim.e . A date
for the new election was set for March 5, 1933. On Feb-
ruary 27, the Reichstag v/as set afire by a young Dutch
Coirar^unist, prov’iding a very welcome confirmation to Hit-
ler’s claims that the Marxist parties v/ere endangering
the very existence of the state. The elections which
followed, and which have proved to be the last in which
any form, of public opinion has been properly expressed,
gave the National Socialist Party a large plurality, but
not the tv/o-thirds m.ajorlty necessary to amend the con-
stitution. Hitler, however, was ready for the situation.
He called the body together and by intimidation suc-
ceeded in pushing through an issue known as the Enabling
Act. 3y this Act the Government was vested with prac-
tically unlimited powers for a period of four years. The
^Llchtenberger
,
H., The Third Reich
,
1937, p. 55.
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only restriction on this act was subsequently reiroved in
a later law, and since that time Hitler has been in full
authority. All that remained was to compose and issue
the various laws which would effectively wipe out the
opposition and alter the instruments of government, giv-
ing "der I’uerher'* satisfactory tools for accomplishing
his aims.
The Economic Structure and Present
Measures of Control.
The economiic problem, in (Germany is one which has
been ever-present with the National Socialists since they
first came to power in 1933. The previous year had marked
the culm.ination of the econom.ic crisis which had prevailed
in Germany and the entire world from 1929 on. Here, as
elsewhere, there was increased unem.pl oy me nt
,
decreased
volum.es of trade, slackening of production, a constant
decline in the index prices, crashes on the exchange, and
financial difficulties of all sorts. It was at this tim.e
' that Hitler chose to come to power, proposing to regim.ent
industry and business and labor in a corporate structure.
The system, which he has devised is extremely com.plex.
There are innumerable instances of an overlapping of
authority, of a contradiction of regulations and of clashes
with Fascist principles. Added to this intricate corporate
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set-up are an indeterminate number of special rules and
regulations for specific industries, strict control
over the instruments of credit, an arbitra.ry restriction
of foreign trade which has amounted almost to governm.ent
operation, and a host of other similar measures which
m.akes the problem of coherently studying the control of
business almost an impossibility. The best approach to
the problem is, perhaps, through an examination of the
Labor Front, which seems always to appear in som.e way
or another, when one attempts to study the various cor-
porate institutions now, in operation.
The Labor Front . The Labor Front was one of the
first institutions set up under the Hitler regim.e
.
Although one high German official has described it as
being concerned not with "the m-aterial questions of daily
labor, but with the high aim of educating all Germ.ans in
active labor life to the National Socialist State and the
National Socialist doctrines, in practice it has becomie
the key institution of the corporate structure of German
industry. By it, Hitler proposed to elim.inate class
warfare, uniting all Gerrr'an labor into one huge union.
Cn Kay 2, 1933, as the first step towards this goal, all
existing trade unions were abolished in the country.
^Brady
,
R. A., The Spirit and Structure of German
Fascism.
,
1937, p. 122.
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Their fimds, buildings, and records were all placed in
the hands of Dr. Robert Lej- . On May 10, the Nazis held
the first meeting of the organization which was designed
to replace these independent unions--the Labor Front. As
it exists today it is a product of this and subsequent
laws v/hich were adopted during the next j^ear and a half.
Membership is open to all German working people whether
they are employers or workers.
Theoretically there is no com.pulsion to join the
Labor Front, but actually membership is a necessary qua-
lification for any position in Germany today. For this
reason it is not surprising to learn that in 1937 it
listed sore 26,000,000 m.em.bers on its rolls. In struc-
ture it closely follows the organization of the National
Socialist Party. But the Labor Front is not supposed to
be a governm.ent department. In practice, however, it
cannot escape from the control of the State, for it
officially ranks as a branch of the Party. Like the
Party its organization is based on the principle of
leadership, with the appointment of all officers by their
respective superiors, and authority proceeding from above.
Hence its actual leader becomes Hitler, with Dr. Ley
operating in the capacity of an executive director. It
is apparent that no closer coordination with the politi-
cal machine could therefore be possible.
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The central office of the Labor Front is divided into
twelve departments to control the tv/elve divisions of Ger-
man industry. Germany itself is divided into thirteen
districts for the purposes of administration. Effective
adm.inistration is left in the hands of three main offices;
the Departm.ent of Matters, the Departm.ent of Persons, and
the Administrative Offices. For all practical purposes
the first of these offices is the important one, being
concerned with such matters as education, wages, working
conditions, new laws, self-governmient
,
and individual
com.plaints, now widely known in the Reich as "offenses
against the social honor of m.em.bers on the Labor Front."
The Factory Council . In the individual plant a
novel idea has been introduced. Under the new regim.e the
conception of owner and worker is eliminatec’ and for it
is substituted the idea of a leader and followers. Accord-
ing to the Act of January, 1934, the owner of the plant is
designated as the leader and he is to "prom.ote the welfare
of his followers, the employees. The latter shall be
loyal to him as fellow members of the working community."!
The leader is to make the decision in all m.atters that
affect the establishm.ent . The means of cooperation is
^Marx
,
F. M., Government In the Third Reich, 1936,
p. 136.
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embodied in a factory council or "confidential council"
over v/hich the owner presides as chairman. Qualifications
for m.embers who may represent the employees are ver^,’
rigid. The candidate m^ust be a memiber of the Labor Front
who has "given definite oroofs of his unreserved devotion
to the National Socialist State." The list of candidates
is drawn uo bv the leader and is then submitted to the
— V
workers, who m.ay accept or reject it. In case the list
is refused, the v/orkers ’ representatives are appointed
by the Labor Trustee of the district.
The matters which these councils consider are many.
Suggestions are m^ade for improving the working conditions
within the plant, and the preparation of other types of
shop rules is comm.on. As in Italy, strikes and lockouts
are no longer tolerated in Germiany. Instead any com-
plaints com.e from m.en who knov/ actual conditions, and
although the chalrmien-leaders have the final word in the
council, the representatives of labor always have recourse
to the Labor Trustees and Labor Courts. The employer is
also obliged to produce his accounts in these councils,
so the possibility of his m.aking Inmiense profits at the
expense of the workers is precluded.
The Labor Trustee . Mention has been m.ade above to
the Labor Trustees. These officials are an innovation of
the Nazi corporate set-up. There is one such official
i\
I
i
-79 -
for every district in Germany. They are appointed by and
answerable to the Reich Minister of Labor. Assistance
for them is provided by a board of experts composed of
representatives of the workers and em.ployers. The chief
task of these trustees as defined by the Reich is the
maintenance of industrial peace. To this end they are
to judge such disputes as are brought to them by the fac-
tory councils or by representatives of either party in
these councils. The Trustees also have j’urisdiction in
such matters as dismissal of workers and the adj'ustm.ent
of wage scales when extenuating circum.stances make the
existing rates unfair. It is also their duty to carry
out the decisions of the courts of honor in their res-
pective districts. In addition to this there are innu-
m.erable reports to be filled out and sent to the central
office in Berlin.
It is apparent that with only thirteen Labor Trus-
tees in the country, and with all the complaints which
they must judge and all the information which they m.ust
file with the government, it would be im.possible for
one man to comipetently fulfill his office. To assist
him, therefore, the Labor Trustee m.ay appoint as mxany
sub-trustees as he deem.s necessary.
Within the district of each of these Labor Trustees
there are also elaborate provisions for round-table dis-
1i
i
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cusslons between industries, and even between districts.
It is the duty of the Trustee to further assist in these
discussions. For the handling of large-scale quarrels
and national disputes, provision has been made for the
parties concerned to neet at the central offices of
the Social Department of the Labor Front in Berlin. The
$
entire system is designed to mediate differences by dis-
cussion and cooperation, and, that failing, by decisions
of the Labor Trustees, from which judgm.ents there is no
appeal
.
The Courts of Social Honor . Another innovation of
the National Socialist regime is a peculiar institution
to protect the "social honor" of the workers. These
courts are coniposed of three members, one from, the judi-
ciary, and one each from labor and industry. There are
thirteen of these courts--one for each district--and a
Supreme Court of Social Honor at Berlin. They were
created to raise the prestige and esteem of the working
class, and m.ay trj anyone "who attem.pts to lower the
dignity of labor."
"According to the Law every employer or
worker ’shall conduct him.self in such a
manner as to show himself worthy of the
respect due to him as a m.ember of the comi-
mon enterprise. In particular he shall
devote all his powers to the service of
the establishment and the coinn:on good,
always bearing in mind his responsibility.’
i
9
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A breach of these obligations makes the
offender liable to an appearance before the
court of honor. A specific instance men-
tioned in the Law, is in the case of the
employer ’abusing his authority by mali-
ciously exploiting labor or wounding the
sense of honor of the workers.’ In the case
of the workers the Law refers parti cualarly
to ’frivolous and unjustifiable complaints
to the labor trustee,’ ’intentional and un-
justifiable interference of shop council
delegates with the work of the enterprise
and m.alicious disturbance of the commiunity
spirit,’ and, finally, ’disclosure by shop
council delegates of professional and trade
secrets and confidential information.’
Penalties imposed by the courts of honor
include warnings, reprimands, fines up to
10,000 miarks, removal of the owner and dis-
missal of the employee."!
The courts also have the right to determine what consti-
tutes fair competition and where unfair competition
begins. There have not been a great many cases where it
has been deemed necessary to remove the owner from the
operation of his business. In such cases where this has
occurred, the authorities have provided a trustee to
assume control of the concern.
This, then, is the system which the Labor Front in
Germany comprises. It can be seen that it has not only
brought a new deal for labor, but has also revolutionized
control over business. Obviously this system, depends for
success upon a totalitarian set-up. Its fundamental prin-
^Florinsky, M. T., Fascism and National Socialism,
1936, p. 140 ff.
J
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ciple was the elimination of class differences in the
interests of the state--bef ore the interests of the indi-
vidual. At the same time it was necessary to retain the
principal of private property and individual initiative,
in essence, if not in actuality. The hierarchal princi-
ples of Fascism, were instituted by constructing an organi-
zation in wnich authority proceeded from, the top. The
system seem.s to have been accepted by labor; whether wil-
lingly or not is another question. For business it repre-
sents but one of the instruments of control. Before
turning to an examination of the others, one or two legis-
lative m.easures designed to control labor should be
looked at first.
The first of these is an instrument known as a "labor
passport." These passports were created by the Law of
February 26, 1935. Their purpose was to assure a "more
rational distribution of -labor through Germany’s economic
system." Such passports contain a complete record of a
worker’s career. The intention was to m.ake easier the
mobilization of industry in case of military necessities.
The second law was passed early in 1935 and empowered
the Minister of Labor to effect the dism.lssal of all
workers in industry who were form.erly employed in agricul-
ture, where a shortage of satisfactory labor had occurred.
The second was to create a shortage of labor in industrial
1I
i
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fields and hence provide work for some of the millions
who were unemployed at the timie . It is manifest that
such a law precludes the selection of an occupation by
the worker.
Although actually not within the scope of this dis-
cussion, we should not leave an exam.ination of the Labor
Front without a brief view of one of its most interesting
organizations, the Strength Through Joy Department (Kraft
durch Freude ) . Its purpose is to organize the leisure of
the workers by providing them, with opportunities for
sports, recreations, travel, and cultural activities of
an artistic, theatrical or musical nature. Especially
in the m:atter of trips for the lower paid workers is
this organization revolutionary. The idea is to get the
worker away from his everyday surroundings. For very
nomdnal prices he can take tours which range from, simiple
week-end excursions into the country to trips abroad on
steam.ers operated for that purpose.
In 1936, alone, 25,000,000 benefited from the use
of the various facilities which the Kraft durch Freude
offered. Despite the huge amount of m.achlnery and per-
sonnel which this must have entailed, it is claim.ed that
it is a self-supporting organization because hotel owners,
transportation facilities, etc., are content to accept a
sm.aller profit in return for an increase in the volume of
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their business. The program of the organization also
calls for construction of private hotels, steamers, res-
taurants, etc., to oe owned and operated by the depart-
ment .
Practical benefit is derived by the state and by
the National Socialist Party through a vigorous propa-
ganda campaign.
In additioR to the Labor Front as a part of the
corporate structure designed to effect state control over
business, there are other institutions which have been
constructed in Hitler’s Germany and remain to be examined
The first of the laws affecting these new organs of
control was passed on P'ebruary 27, 1934. At this time
the Law for the Organic Reconstruction of German Business
was passed. By it the Reich Minister of Econom-ics re-
ceived very wide plenary powers to regulate business. He
was permitted to name any employers’ association as the
sole representative of that particular branch of Industry
to Fiake Kiemibership in such an association compulsory to
all firms in that line of business, or to set up or merge
any other trade associations as he saw fit. He was also
granted the power to create the thirteen divisions of
German industry. By this law all the trade associations
that had existed in the past were coordinated under the
i
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Ministry .
The next step in constructing the corporate system
of German business was introduced by the decree of Novem-
ber 27, 1934. This decree brought about the complete
reorganization of business and most of the provisions of
the earlier law were set aside. The organization which
was created by this law, and by a subsequent decree, is
the structure which exists today. Bu this law the Reich
Chamber of Economics was established. In all its rami-
fications it is an organization of very intricate detail
and com.plexity. In essence it m.ay be said to consist of
two sets of employers* associations.
(1) The first of these is composed of the
Reichsgruppen (industry, comjrerce, banks,
insurance, public utilities, and handi-
crafts) which with their local organs, are
professional associations of the respec-
tive branches of economic activity orga-
nized on the vertical principle.
(2) The second organization consists of
comm.erce and industry’, which are regional
associations organized on the territorial
or horizontal principle. These chambers
or coiranerce and Industry are united into
a Federation which is in turn incorpo-
rated into the Reich Chamber of Economics.^
Thus, by means of these vertical and horizontal
^Florinsky, M. T., Fas c ism and National Socialism,
1936, p. 102 ff.
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associations
,
the Reichagruppen and the Federation of the
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, business may be con-
trolled in either of two manners. The conservative and
long-established chambers of commerce have thus survived
this reorganization and retained their identity. It had
been expected that they would be eliminated and their
retention was hailed with much satisfaction by the busi-
ness interests.
The result of the creation of this Reich Chamber of
Economics nas been to give the Reich what is for all
practical purposes unlimited power of control over the
entire business structure of the country. Organized,
as it is, upon the principle of authority from above, its
president, as also the president of the Federation of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, is appointed by the
Ministry of Economics. The president, in turn, appoints
his subordinate officers.
There were two main purposes in the reorganization.
First, the new Law was intended to increase the control
of the state over business, and in this the plan was
very successful. Second the Law was created with the
purpose of altering the fundam.ental character of the for-
mer trade associations. The leaders in Germ.an business
were now to give first attention to the furtherance of
"national solidarity," rather than to professional and
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trade interests. This is, of course, the usual Fascist
tenet of state welfare before personal interests.
Cn I'arch 26, 1935, at the Congress of the Labor
Front, Dr. Schacht, who was Minister of Economics,
announced that he and Dr. Ley had come to an important
decision. It had been decided to unite the Labor Front
and the Reich Chamber of Economics. It will be rem^em-
bered that the em.ployers had already been persuaded to
join the Labor Front as a measure of expediency and
cooperation with the new regim.e for German business.
Thus, this later decision has m.ade them members of the
Labor front in a double capacity. Other aspects of the
union seem to be m.ore im^portant . 3y the establishment
of this double organization the Chamber of Economics
becamie the Economic Department of the Labor Front, which
m.eant that no im.portant economic m.easures could be taken
by the Labor Front without the approval of the Chamber,
which v/as subordinated to Dr. Schacht, then Minister of
Econorrics
.
A special Labor and Economic Board was also estab-
lished to assist in coordinating the interests of the
two organizations in questions of economic and social
policy. It is composed of the higher officials of both
associations, with the participation of the Minister of
Economics. Throughout the industrial groups, at all
Ai
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stages of the organization, collaboration was now begun
through cominittees established upon the principle of
parity between the leaders and their followers. The
design of these cominittees is to take some of the bur-
den off of the Labor Trustees, who were becoming over-
v/helmed by a vast number of petty cases, hardly important
enough to bother the state. In this regard Dr. Ley
expressed the attitude of the state when he said, "The
true leader is one who can convince his subordinates
that he is acting for the common welfare and does not
need to hide behind the decision of some superior offi-
cial. In the future the state will say to com.plaintant s:
’Lock yourselves up in a room, discuss, argue if neces-
sary, but find a com.prom.ise and do not lazily hand over
to another the task of solving the difficulties which
ari se . ’ "
The union of the Labor front and the Reich Chamber
of Econom.ics was hailed by the labor interests as a sig-
nificant victory, and as a striking instance of the new
cooperation which exists between the owner and the worker
in Germiany today. Other appraisals, however, take Just
the opposite view. The psychological effect, the skeptics
will admit, was bound to be enormous. But bej^ond this,
the idea seem.s to exist that all Dr. Schacht gave to the
Labor front was purely verbal satisfaction. The coopera-
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tion between the committees of employers and employees
was limited to the field of social policy. No attempt
was miade to similarly attain a cooperation in the attack-
ing of industrial questions. The consensus of unofficial
opinion therefore seems to be that the position of busi-
ness was strengthened rather than weakened by the union
of the two organizations: that business interests were
safeguarded by the control which the Minister of Econo-
mics may now exert over the economilc activities of the
Labor Front. In the long run, however, if we can accept
the doctrine of "primary national interests" at its face
value, all that will eventually matter is the welfare of
the Reich, and any control which one organization or the
other m.ay seem to possess will fade before the attitude
of Hitler and the Party and the Nation,
From the moment that Dr. Ley dissolved the trade
unions of Germany on the morning of May 1, '1933, ‘there
has been an ever-increasing control of business by the
Reich. The corporate system, in Gemiany, while it may
not yet have achieved its fundamental purpose of an
autonomous-planned economy, has been an instrument for
ever-tightening grip which the State has obtained over
the Institutions of business. In the Labor Front, Dr.
Ley was appointed by Hitler; officially the body is a
branch of the National Socialist Party; employee miember-
i
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shlp in the basic organization, the factory council, is
subject to approval of higher authorities. The Labor
Trustees have jurisdiction in full over the operations
of industries and business in their respective regions;
they are a supreme court of appeal in industrial rela-
tions and negotiations; officially they are answerable
only to the Reich Minister of Labor, who ha3 appointed
them, and who has, in his turn, been selected by Hitler.
The Courts of Honor have authority which extends even to
the removal of an owner from the head of his business.
The reorganization of the Chambers of Comne rce and their
subsequent union with the Labor Front has effectively
provided for further regimentation of business in any
manner which m.ay be desired.
In this corporate structure. Hitler, as Mussolini
did in Italy, constructed an instrumient for the control
of business that has no limit. Here again the fact of
state Intervention has become a continual relation rather
than a policy of expediency. But the coordination of the
activities of business and industry by Germany, in the
form, of the Corporate State, does not entirely complete
the picture of the restrictive measures which have been
placed on all fields of economic endeavor. Various
industries and branches of industry are subject to special
regulations applicable to their own particular activities.
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That it would be Impossible to cover all of these is
immediately evident when it is known that one German
authority places the number of these special ordinances
at 700 to 1,000 each week.l Ke 9;oes on to state that
it is also im.posslble to carry out even the simplest
cash transaction without som.e official interference..
In another instance, a m.emiber of the Reich Government
is cited as admitting that sixty per cent of the corres
pondence of a German manufacturer is now taken up with
official communications which are necessary to secure
miaterlals, determine selling prices, or at times even
whether he m.ay sell.^ An examination of the specific
branches of business must, therefore, be very general
in its coverage. At the outset it is apparent what the
Geiman business man is facing. In the fields where
nationalization has not actually occurred, he is up
against such an enorm.ous am.ount of red tape that his
very economic esixtence becom.es a struggle against a
bureaucracy which has had no precedent.
General Business . Since the advent of the Nazi
administration in Germany there have been three or four
^
” German! cus , " Germany the Last Four Years, 1937,
p. 27.
^Reimann, Gunther, "Doing Business in Germiany,"
Harper* s Magazine
,
March 1939, p. 373.
i
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major problems which have been the motivating factors in
the rigid control which Hitler has attempted to maintain
over business. Nor is this fusion of the interests of
the government and business anything accidental; it has
been an integral part of the National Socialist program
to achieve and maintain a strict direction of all the
institutions of German business and of its economic
policy. It is recognized on all side3--and to nobody
is it plainer than to Hitler hlm.self--that the Nazi
state will survive or fall with the outcome of the eco-
nomic dilemma which has been ever-present since the
foundation of the current government.
In 1932, and in 1933, when Hitler came to power,
there existed in Germany the same economic depression
as in the rest of the world. There were the same pro-
blem.s of Increased unemployment, the same nadir of pro-
duction and other industrial activity, the sarnie losses
of foreign trade, the same contractions of credit--
everything that is common to depressions was facing
Hitler when he becam.e Chancellor.
From the first the Nazi program has em.phasized the
necessity of building an invincible military miachine.
A short tim.e after the inception of the Hitler regim.e
all the m.ilitary clauses of the Treaty of Versaille s
were repudiated. Germany was also withdrawn from the
4
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League of Nations. These steps were for the sole purpose
that the nation might be free to begin to rebuild the
army and navy that had been hers before the great war.
Hitler had promised this to the people and to accom.plish
it he has continually added to the might of the new Ger-
man m.ilitary creation.
In 1936 a new problem was introduced into the Nazi
economic program. Within four years. Hitler announced,
the nation was to attain complete self-sufficiency. To
accomplish this, it might be necessary to regiment busi-
ness m.ore severely than ever, German science would have
to develop new products, and undeveloped German resources
would have to be exploited to their full capacity. It
would entail, he admitted, further pressure upon business
and industry, yet, every nations should be prepared to
live on its own resources. "This," according to the miem-
bers of the party, "is a categoric postulate from, the
economic as well as the political point of view."
These were the three major objectives of the Nazi
economic program. To solve them^ it is evident that the
leaders of the state would have to declare for rigid
m.easures of control. Indeed the doctrines upon which
the Party was founded v/ould permdt no other policy.
I
Hence it is not strange to find that Hitler has continu-
ally tightened -the strings upon industry and business.
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In name, we may still find private property and the right
of the individual to direct the instruments of production
as he sees fit. In fact, we may only find the closest of
state control, designed to further the aims of the nation
at the sacrifice of all the economiic principles which had
formerly made industrial and business Germany a pattern
for other countries to follow.
Under the new system there is bound to be political
corruption and favoritism.
"The whole form of business, its accents, its
risks, have been changed. Today the main
thing is not so much to buy cheaply, gauge
the right production, and sell well. The
most im.portant thing is to win and retain the
favor of the local Party chieftains and the
State bureaucrats who control your line of
business, to secure State orders, State per-
mits for raw materials or foreign currency,
and State authorization of a selling price. . .
"In former days the purchasing agent and the
sales manager were among the m*ost im.portant
m.embers of a business organization. Today
the em.phasis has shifted, and all-important
now is a curious new business aide, a sort
of com.bination 'go-between' and public rela-
tions counsel. This person not the least
interesting outgrowth of the Nazi economic
system, miakes it his .iob to maintain good
personal relations with the officials of the
Economics Ministry in Berlin, to which city
he is constantly traveling; he studies all
the new regulations and decrees, knows how
to interpret them in his firm's case, and
can guess at wnat is allowed or forbidden,
or, in other words, how far one can go with-
out being caught.
"Any firm wishing to remain in business m.ust
have such a contact man. If possible he m.ust
’ 1
f
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be endowed with a good personal acquaintance
with some high official . If a firm cannot
find a m^an with such qualifications they will
have to content themselves with a man having
contact with a lesser official, who can in
his turn bespeak their interests with his
superiors, and inform them, of how the wind is
blowing. Should a firm, fail altogether to
find a contact m.an and otherwise have bad
luck in establishing good working relations
with officialdom., purest 'Aryan’ though they
be, they are liable to be forced out of
business
.
Foreign Trade. There is no field of business
endeavor in Germ.any today where this is m.ore true than in
the field of foreign trade. For ever since the beginning
of the Nazi regim.e the governm.ent has been faced with the
problem, of a trade balance which has been continually
m.ore unfavorable. To combat this trade deficit it entered
a policy of increasingly rigid control over imports and
exports which finally culm.inated in 1934 in a so-called
"New Plan" for imports. By this plan twenty-five boards
were established, one for each of the ma.^or import items.
Perm.lts were necessary from, these boards to obtain ship-
m.ents of goods from foreign countries. The Relchsbank
assumed full control over the supply of foreign exchange.
Definite amiounts were then doled out to the importing
com.panies. The plan was designed to determ.ine that ship-
^Reimiann, Gunther, "Doing Business in Germany,"
Harper * s Magazine
,
March 1939, p. 373, ff
.
1
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ments of imports into the country never exceeded shipments
of exports out of the country, and this restriction has
I
been rigidly adhered to since that time. As the demand
of the armaments industries for raw materials is of pri-
mary government concern, it is only natural that most of
the im.port allowances have been to these industries. The
result has been that in many cases it is almiost im.possi-
ble for other concerns, whose m.anufacturing depends upon
securing raw miaterials from, other nations, to survive.
The boards have also exercised great influence in other
ways. They have assumied the responsibility of meting
out materials which have been brought into the country,
they have favored businesses which export miore than they
im^port, they have mianaged the clientele of buyers of
Germian products and foreign suppliers, and they have
even intervened in the actual organization and methods
of m.anufacture of the imported goods.
In the export field drastic steps have been taken to
bring about an increase. Foremost among these measures
is the Export Subsidy Plan introduced in 1935. By this
plan, the Cham.ber of Economdcs was empowered to levy a
tv/o to five per cent assessr.ent upon the annual turnover
of businesses and associations. The proceeds thus
acquired were to be used to prom.ote exports. Under this
plan an exporter m.ust first prove that he actually has a
i
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F.arket for the goods under consideration and only at a
price which will mean a loss to him. If he can sell at
such very low prices, the German economists figure, he
can com.pete v/ith similar goods of a foreign make, and
thus increase the sale of German products in foreign
m.arkets. If he can make the sale at these low prices,
the subsidy board will grant him. remuneration to make up
for his loss on the sale. This subsidy somietim.es amxounts
to as high as 40 per cent of the selling price, and in
extreme cases it has been known to extend to 80 per cent.
Another device which has been used to stimulate
export trade was barter. This was the direct barter of
pre-civilization days, or bilateral barter with other
countries. The principle was the sam.e in each case:
Germ.an im.porters would buy goods from foreign dealers
in large amounts. After a time, when these foreign
countries began to ask for a settlem.ent of an account,
Germany countered that such payment was only perm.itted in
goods. To further increase the vexation of the foreign
concerns it was also established that certain goods
should have em.bargoes, prohibiting their export from, the
country. Thus, if the other countries were to receive
any payment it had to be in the goods which were stipu-
lated by Germ.any. And frequently these products were
item.s such as armam;ents or miaterials for public works.
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Then if any further stocks were needed by the other nations
they had to return to Germany to get the proper supplies.
'ATholesale Trade . A peculiar feature of the rigid
control of foreign trade was the effect vy^iich it had upon
internal prices, and subsequently upon the wholesale and
retail trade.
In order to maintain exports in the face of devalued
currencies of other nations in the depression, it was
necessary to keep the price of German exports from rising.
This price, however, was inextricably related tx) domestic
prices. Eence, it was necessary, as far as possible, to
keep domestic prices stable. Simultaneously, the autho-
rities decided that the prices of foods and agricultural
products should be raised to provide aid to the peasant
class. At the sarnie time, then, the prices of other pro-
ducts must be watched very closely to prevent an increase.
Thus government was lead to the delicate problem, of try-
ing to control prices on a national scale.
On the other side of the picture is the wholesaler
who is trying to m.ake a profit. The scarcity of many
goods has strengthened the hands of the dealer who can
get them. Yet he is harassed by innumerable restrictions.
Foods, as the most vital field, have been priced to
increase the profit to the agricultural classes, yet the
selling price for the dealer has been limited to the
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point where profit is alirost at the vanishing point. To
get around this difficulty, the wholesaler has resorted
to "combination deals," in which he tries to force the
retailer, in order to get a supply of the essential con-
sumer goods, to also buy a supply of luxury products
where he hopes to raise the price and make his profit.
However, as we have stated, the government has been forced
to manipulate and control the prices of these non-essen-
tials very closely. Thus the wholesaler in Germany today
is in a very precarious position, being prevented from
m.aklng any profit upon food and other necessaries, and
trying to earn a living from non-essentials, which are
also closely watched.
Retail Trade . But it is the retailer in Germ.any
who is the miost depressed business class today. The
wholesaler has managed to bring about som.e sort of rise
in his prices--at least enought to warrant his remaining
in business. But when we look at the individual shop-
owner, we see the man who must eventual ly take the
squeeze between this rise in prices, with also a con-
stantly elevating raw miaterial cost level, and the
rigidly controlled price at which he must sell to the
actual consumer.
To add to his discomfiture the German governm.ent has
also introduced the Russian system: of the "closed mono-
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poly shop."l Under this system each retailer is assigned
a number of custom.ers who have to buy from him and to
whom he alone m.ay sell. True, he is assured a steady
turnover, since the amount of foodstuffs which he can
sell to each customer is rationed. This system is not
yet general, being largely confined to the food products,
and to stores in the large cities. However, it is’ rapid-
ly being enlarged and is regarded as the retail system of
the future
.
Department stores have always been a particular tar-
get for National Socialism, its adherents defending the
sm:all traders against these large stores and the chains,
'^fiien it cam_e to eliminating them, however, the Nazis
found that they would have to proceed more slowly, for
the large number of such stores would have provided a
serious addition to the unemployment problem if they had
been entirely liquidated. Measures have been taken to
curb the growth of this type of outlet, nevertheless.
An early law prohibited the opening of any new store of
this type. Later laws made the opening of all retail
shops subject to license, dependent upon the need for
such a store and the standing of the applicant. Thus
^"Germ.anicus
,
** Germ.any the Last Four Years
,
1937,
p . 45
.
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undesirable elements were to be completely excluded from
trade, since the , requirements were made retroactive,
thus applying to those stores already in operation 6s
well as new establishments.
Industrial Enterprises . Industrial enterprises
in general are in m^uch the same straits as is trade.
Only in the heavy industries engaged in armaments, steel
products, automobiles and products needed for public
works projects will a good m.easure of prosperity be found.
The ordinary producer is bound by the same regimentation
of Industry as other fields of business endeavor. Chief
am*ong his worries, especially if he is dependent upon
foreign supplies, is his raw njaterial problem. He m.ust
now contend with such things as Emergency Certificates
for raw materials, allov/ances for foreign currency, per-
mits for an increase in his sale price if costs go up,
and even interference with his m.anufacturing processes.
Everywhere he must be sure that he is in step with
an infinite number of regulations and office decrees at
Berlin. This has entailed a huge increase in his adm'inis-'
tratlve costs, and he immediately runs afoul of the gov-
ernment on this angle because his production is so
regulated that he is allowed only the smallest of mar-
gins for profit. Now he finds that the administrative
needs have raised his costs prohibitively, and he must
i]
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contend with an enormous amount of red tape and bureau-
cratic interference if he succeeds in elevating his sel-
ling price.
To make matters worse, if he does succeed in m.aking
a profit, the government has need of it. Any profit
over six per cent or in certain cases eight per cent, miay
not be paid out in dividends to the stockholders. Earn-
ings above this amount must be turned over to the Gold
Discount Bank which acts as a trustee for them, deliver-
ing governm.ent notes for them. At the end of three
years, when this short term, paper matures, the funds are
then returned to the concern and are now available for
dividend purposes. In addition to this regimentation of
corporation funds, all corporations and businesses are
levied under the Export Subsidy Plan which has been out-
lined above.
But this is not all that business has to face. The
Lav/ of July 15, 1933, in the first year of the Hitler
regime, gave the Minister of Economics the power to pre-
vent the extension of existing Industrial plants, and
by a later act to prevent new ones if he saw fit to do
so. He also has the power to revise existing cartel
agreements or combinations, and to insist upon new ones
which seem propitious to him. Prohibitions are also
extended to the working hours per week or to the amounts
i
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of wages. Employers are forced to retain workers to aid
the unem.pl oyment problem. At other times requirements
are issued to scrap existing modern machinery. Contri-
butions to all sorts of Party purposes are imiposed.
Despite this increased bureaucracy one class of
industry has prospered, as vie have mentioned. Due to
the enormous expenditures by the government, first in
attempting to alleviate the unemploym.ent problem, and
later in pursuance of its rearm.ament program., the heavy
industries have prospered. Certain other concerns, in
an effort to maintain their existence, have taken up the
manufacture of substitute materials necessary in the
government’s cam.paign for self-sufficiency, and have
reached a m.easure of prosperity. Thus, such firms as
the Thyssen and Krupp interests, and the great Steel
Trust, have made com.plete recoveries from^ the low periods
of the depression, have recovered from near bankruptcy,
and even have had enough to spare to gain control of
some of the larger banking interests of the country.
Utilities. In the utility fields we find quite
another picture. Here flrm.s have not been allov/ed to
even retain their identity as private concerns, but in
the m.ajority of cases have been sub.^ect to outright
nationalization. For example, in the railroad field in
1934 there were 36,277 miles of lines. Of these.
jrA
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33,475 miles were state lines, composing the largest
railway system, in the world. Similarly, all other pub-
lic communications in Germany --telephone
,
telegraph,
postal service and radio--are owned by the Nazi govern-
m.ent, A special Advertising Council, subject to_the
Minister of Propaganda, holds strict control over all
radio and other types of advertising.
Banking and Finance . Strictly speaking, the
banks of Germany, like other business concerns, are in
the hands of private owners. But, even more thoroughly
than other types of business, the banks are under the
strong control of the Beich government. It is apparent
that they would have to be in order to maintain Hitler’s
control over business in general and prices, and to
assure the state of sufficient funds to carry out its
public works and rearmament programs. Thus, they actu-
ally have no semblance of independence remaining, but
are now merely the instruments of the Reich to procure
credit that the government m.ay finance its spending.
The better to accom.plish this, the presidents are required
to watch over their depositors' investments to see that
they are in line with the official policy. They are to
finance no nev/ enterprise, float no share issue, without
permission from the authorities in the government. Their
own funds, as we have pointed out, must be used to meet
J
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state needs.
The first step in banking changes in the new Reich
came with the Sank Reform Law of December 5, 1934. This
law reaffirmed the decision of the state to retain a
private banking system, but under very rigid control.
By this law banks were prohibited from opening new
credit institutions or branches without first obtaining
a license. This license v/as issued not alone upon good
financial standing, but also was dependent upon the moral
and business qualifications of the applicant. The law
provided for a supervisory board which was given very
wide powers. The Board consists of the President of the
Reichsbank, nominated by Eitler, a representative of the
Chancellor, and several high government officials. In
operation, the chief function of the board is to keep
the policies of banking in line with the desires of the
government. How well this was accomplished is evidenced
by the success achieved by Dr. Schacht
,
until recently
President of the Reichsbank and of this Board of Bank
Supervision
.
I
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CONCLUSIONS
It is very difficult to attempt an appraisal of the
Fascist economic state as it is portrayed by the corpo-
rate systems of Italy and Germany. A host of formidable
miajor problems of a business and industrial nature still
confront each of these nations. How these will be met
nobody, not even the leaders of the states themselves,
knows. They have been following a path achieved by the
process of trial and error, and dictated by policies
which have been conflicting on many fronts and often
altered by mitigating economic considerations. Conse-
quently, miany of their plans are still for the future.
The Fascist Corporate State, as they hope eventually to
develop it, is still a product of the future.
It is not within the province of this discussion
to forecast what form, the Fascist state of the future
will take. Lack of accurate positive inform.atlon about
many of the major points of the present system and want
of technical com.petence to Interpret this information
if it were available, would cause m.os t students of the
problem, let alone the writer, to avoid such predictions
There are, nevertheless, some definite conclusions and
trends which are already in evidence.
In the first place, there is no doubt about the con

- 107 -
trol of business, nor about the extent to which it exists,
in the Fascist state. Both Italy and Germany have con-
structed instruments, however faulty and subject to change
they may be, which have permitted any measure of control
which the government may desire. And the political forces
have not hesitated to use these constructions. Industry,
comm.erce, banking, and other fields of business endeavor
in both nations now exist under a regime of directed
economy. The economic structure and the political orga-
nization function reciprocally, and are not supposed to
do otherwise; without exaggeration it may be said that
everything in the field of business under Fascism^ is
also political. And the action of the state is assuming
an ever-increasing importance in the business realm. It
is the state which has decreed corporate organization of
peasants and industrial workers. It is the state which
has been led to control foreign exchange, foreign trade,
banking, industrial production, and even, finally, the
most insignificant cash transactions which occur in the
independent retailers’ little shops. It is the state,
too, which has regimented the earning of business con-
cerns to its own uses. Everywhere the state is in
evidence to coordinate private initiative and private
means of production to its own designs.
1
^Lichtenberger
,
H., The Third Reich
.
1937, p. 259.
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On all these points, it is clear, state action and
action by the bureaucratic system which it has instituted
have replaced the action of individual entrepreneurs, as
we know it in a democratic country--and as it was former-
ly known in Germany and Italy. And still the Fascist
leaders admdt their abhorrence of a bureaucratic regime,
and claim to recognize its attendant evils and v/ish to
avoid it.
"Dr. Schacht himself has said: ’The new
plan is a terrible thing because it neces-
sarily presupposes an increase in bureauc-
racy and organization. . . We are all
agreed on one thing, namely that the stan-
dard of our people cannot be maintained by
means of the bureaucratization of our entire
econom-ic life.’ The disadvantages of
bureaucratic action are well-known. They
are schematicism and lack of elasticity.
'When individual initiative finds itself
replaced by the decision of an omnipotent
authority, the dangers of serious mistakes
which might affect the entire economic
structure of the nation will be found to have
considerably increased. In principle, there-
fore, the Nazis maintain private initiative
and free com.petitlon between business enter-
prises. In practice, however, they greatly
reduce this initiative, and they entrust the
task of enormous and perhaps overwhelming
direction to a smiall number of leaders and a
huge bureaucracy."!
The sam.e situation prevailed in Italy. Florinsky relates
a discussion with an Italian exporter, who was a member
^Llchtenberger
,
H., The Third Reich
, 1937, p. 259.
V
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of the Fascist Party. This man described the tortuous
bureaucratic methods and the interminable com.plications
which he was up against, and added: "Now on top of all
these are to come the corporations," which, from, a mem-
ber of the Party, did not auger well for the spirit of
the business.
1
One of the cardinal tenets of Fascist philosophy
states that class warfare and differences miust be over-
com.e, that they are not permissible in conjunction with
the superior interests of the nation. It has been one of
the boasts of the Fascist countries that they have accom-
plished this, and that strikes and lock-outs are no
longer a part of their economic systems. This much seems
to be a fact. Records show very few evidences of vio-
lent differences between the interests of the workers and
the interests of the employers in Germany and Italy under
the present regimes. Despite this, there is a general
acceptance among most observers that this elimination of
class warfare has been primarily at the expense of the
workers. That, although the situation of the capital
interests is dire enough, whatever weights are in the
balance have thrown the scales in the favor of capitalists
^Florin sky, M. T., Fascism, and National Socialism.
,
1936, p. 116.
)..
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Haider claims that this was inevitable. She points
first to the cleavage between Fascist and Socialist
principles, which require that individual ownership be
retained in economic fields on the one hand, and owner-
ship by the people on the other. In addition, she goes
on to say, the working class has had none of the experi-
ence and contains none of the educated geniuses which
the dictators have to retain in control in order to pre-
vent a cataclysmic disintegration of the business struc-
ture.^ Therefore, Plitler and Mussolini have no choice
but to favor the capitalistic classes, although their
doctrine demands the support of the peasant and working
people. Thus capitalism* still holds whatever upper
hand may exist in the Fascist state. Other writers will
go even further, claiming that the cooperation which
exists between the employers and employees is limited
primarily to questions of social policy. That in the
problems of wage determinations, working conditions, etc.,
control is still fundamentally in the hands of the capi-
talists. They say that the main purpose of the consul-
tive agencies which have been established is to create
a rational bond between the political powers and the
^Kaider
,
Carmen, Do We Went Fascism?
,
1934, p. 35
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financial powers, corporatism thus becoming a dictatorial
regime in the interests of the capitalists.
It is also one of the claims of the Fascist govern-
ments in both Italy and Germany that they have restored
prosperity to their people. Authorities seem to agree,
however, that this prosperity is more on the surface than
it would appear at first. For both nations have followed
the same general plans in reducing unemployment and in
speeding up production. Public works and armament pro-
grams have been the fundamental basis of government
action in both countries. The result has been that the
measure of prosperity which they have reached is depen-
dent largely on governmient orders, and is confined
almiost entirely to the heavy good industries. In proof
of this contention of the instability of the prosperity,
the critics point to a lowered standard of living and
lowered wages in both countries. Other factors such as
increased taxes, a continued falling off of foreign
trade and especially an increasing shortage in consumer
goods are also advanced to further this contention.
Finally, governnient spending has increased enormously
at home, and the commercial debts abroad are growing no
smaller
.
What then, we may ask, will be the final result of
the control of business in these Fascist states? That
’ <•
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is the question which everybody asks--and nobody can
answer. And it is still the question of paramount impor-
tance facing Hitler and Mussolini. Despite recent inter-
national developments which have stressed the military
and colonial aspects of the dictator regimes, the eco‘-
nomic problems are still their first consideration. The
Fascist countries will stand or fall with the outcome of
their attempts to win out on the economic battle-front.
But their leaders cannot say that they have not the means
of complete control over the economic structure in their
efforts to win this victory. And having suprem-e autho-
rity in national plannlng--however full of faulty the
corporate system, m.ay be--they must use it. Vi/hether they
will be successful is still the unanswered question.
The future alone can tell.
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